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In the light of new political initiatives in Latin America, discussions of expanding the 
monetary cooperation in the region have intensified and the idea of monetary union is 
gaining popularity. Since literature on the subject widely dismisses the feasibility of 
Latin America adopting a single currency in the short- to medium-term, several authors 
have proposed to follow the European example by establishing a regional exchange rate 
system,  similar  to  the  European  Monetary  System  (EMS),  as  an  intermediate  step. 
While these proposals usually describe the general benefits of an EMS-type system for 
Latin America, they rarely discuss how such a regional arrangement can institutionally 
be designed or what the main lessons are, that can be derived from the EMS experience, 
in order for a Latin American exchange rate system to be successful. Thus, it is the 
central aim of this paper to address these specific issues by providing a detailed look at 
the  design  and  functioning  of  regional  fixed  rate  systems  as  an  intermediate  step 
towards  monetary  union.  For  this  purpose,  first,  an  overview  of  the  current  Latin 
American initiatives in the field of monetary integration is given, followed by a general 
analysis of fixed rate systems from an institutional perspective. This analysis presents 
the basic design choices available to policymakers when creating such a system and 
describes how the decided upon rules (i.e. the institutional framework) determine the 
overall  monetary  adjustment  constraints  for  the  participating  countries.  Further,  the 
paper  examines  the  historic,  political  and  economic  rationale  as  well  as  the  overall 
institutional design and functioning of a specific fixed rate system, namely the EMS. It 
is shown that the EMS did not only constitute an efficient monetary arrangement by 
effectively reducing both nominal and real exchange rate variability in the region, but 
can  also  be  considered  a  successful  intermediate  step  towards  monetary  union  in 
Europe. The paper ends with a discussion of the main lessons drawn from the EMS 
analysis and their implications for the Latin American prospects of possibly establishing 
a similar regional exchange rate mechanism. 
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1  Introduction 
Despite being able to look back at over 50 years of integration history, success regarding 
monetary  cooperation  in  Latin  America  has  been  very  modest.  Nevertheless,  a  variety  of 
recent initiatives in the region are providing new integration impulses, and voices advocating 
the implementation of a single  Latin American  currency  are  getting louder. While a full-
fledged monetary union in Latin America might still be a long-term goal at best, the time 
could be ripe for the implementation of an intermediate step towards monetary unification. 
Many sources endorsing this option propose following the European example and introduce a 
regional  exchange  rate  mechanism  in  Latin  America  similar  to  the  European  Monetary 
System (EMS) that was established in Europe in the late 1970s. While the advocates of an 
EMS-type  system  for  Latin  America  usually  describe  the  general  benefits  of  such  an 
arrangement, little discussion on the different ways in which this intermediate step  could 
potentially be designed and also on what lessons can be derived from the EMS experience in 
order for a Latin American exchange rate system to be successful, is provided. Despite, or 
maybe precisely because of the recent developments in the EU, that have cast a shadow on 
European Monetary Union, an in-depth analysis of the European experience on the road to 
monetary integration and its lessons for Latin America might prove especially relevant. Thus, 
the aim of this paper is to asses the effectiveness of a regional exchange rate system as an 
intermediate step towards monetary union by first presenting the available institutional design 
options for such a system and then analysing how these institutional features interacted in a 
specific scenario (i.e. the historical experience of the European countries with the EMS). This 
detailed  institutional  analysis  of  regional  fixed  rate  systems  in  general  and  the  EMS  in 
particular might provide important lessons and implications for the Latin American prospects 
of monetary union by way of an intermediate step. 
In order to address these aspects this paper will be structured as follows. First, chapter 2 will 
discuss the general integration developments in Latin America by assessing the degree of 
already achieved monetary cooperation within a few of the main integration projects in the 
region, and then describe the Latin American plans for monetary unification as well as the 
proposals for an intermediate step towards this long-term goal. 
This will be followed by chapter 3, in which the proposed intermediate step, a regional fixed 
rate system, will be thoroughly analysed from an institutional perspective in order to describe 
the basic design choices available to policymakers when creating such a regional exchange 2 
 
rate  arrangement  and  show  how  the  decided  upon  rules  determine  the  overall  monetary 
adjustment constraints for the participating countries in the system. In chapter 4, the economic 
and political rationale, as well as the design and performance of a specific historical fixed rate 
system,  the  EMS,  will  be  analyzed,  in  order  to  provide  an  overall  assessment  on  the 
effectiveness of regional exchange rate arrangements. Finally, chapter 5 will discuss some of 
the main implications of the analyses  given in chapters 3 and 4 for a possible fixed rate 
system  in  Latin  America  and  also  point  to  further  research  necessary  for  a  specific 
implementation proposal. Chapter 6 concludes this paper by providing a short summary and 
some final remarks. 
 
2  Developments in Latin American Integration 
2.1  Monetary Integration in Latin America 
Since the  early  1960s,  a number of  regional economic and political integration processes 
involving Latin American countries have developed. They include, in historical order, the 
Latin  American  Free  Trade  Association  (LAFTA),  which  became  the  Latin  American 
Integration Association (LAIA) in 1980, the Central American Common Market (CACM), the 
Andean Community (CAN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Common Market of 
the South (Mercosur) and more recently the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) 
and the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America – People’s Trade Agreement 
(ALBA-TCP).
1 These regional integration blocs and agreements have launched a variety of 
initiatives  in  order  to  promote  intra-regional  trade  and  strengthen  macroeconomic 
convergence among their members. Furthermore, there are parallel proposals like the US-led 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), several overlaps regarding member states as well 
as countries leaving integration projects and joining others. Chile, for instance, which left the 
CAN in 1977, has signed free trade agreements (FTA) with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement  (NAFTA)  countries,  but  also  has  an  FTA  with  Mercosur  and  has  in  the  past 
expressed interest in full membership. Venezuela left the CAN in 2006 and has signed a 
membership agreement to enter Mercosur, although the full membership is still pending on 
the ratification by the Paraguayan parliament. There is also a series of other bilateral FTAs 
connecting  the  countries  in  the  continent.  In  addition,  Mexico,  Chile,  a  part  of  the  CAN 
                                                 
1 Note that several of the abbreviations and acronyms throughout the section follow the Spanish names in order 
to keep the widely accepted nomenclature of the different integration schemes.  3 
 
countries and Mercosur have all concluded or are negotiating FTAs with the European Union 
(EU), and the CACM has expressed interest in negotiating such an agreement with the EU. In 
sum, there is a complex set of trade agreements involving Latin American countries and a 
high degree of uncertainty about the future shape of trade and economic integration within the 
continent.
2  Attempting  to  assess  the  advisability  (i.e.  effectiveness  and  problems)  or 
determine the likelihood of all the different roads to economic integration in the American 
continent proposed by the diverse agreements and initiatives is well beyond the scope of this 
section  (and  paper).  Rather,  this  section  will  focus  on  the  integration  developments 
specifically regarding monetary and financial cooperation in the region by providing a brief 
overview  of  such  initiatives  promoted  by  a  few  of  the  main  and  comparatively  recent 
economic and/or political integration projects in Latin America. The examples that will be 
briefly presented are the two main economic integration agreements Mercosur and CAN, as 
well as the more recently created and more politically oriented UNASUR and ALBA-TCP: 
·  The  Mercosur  was  created  in  1991  through  the  Treaty  of  Asunción.  Its  founding 
members  are  Argentina,  Brazil,  Paraguay  and  Uruguay.  Since  then  Bolivia,  Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have become Associate members; as well as Venezuela 
that is awaiting full membership.
3 The Treaty of Asunción provided Mercosur with an 
individual institutional framework and established the main objective of creating a 
common market with free movement of goods, services and productive factors until 
the  year  1994,  as  well  as  adopting  a  common  external  trade  policy,  coordinating 
common  positions  in  international  forums  and  coordinating  sectoral  and 
macroeconomic policies.
4 Institutionally, Mercosur is comprised by the Council of the 
Common Market, the Common Market Group, the Mercosur Trade Commission, the 
Joint  Parliamentary  Commission  (later  the  Parliament  of  the  Mercosur),  the 
Economic-Social  Consultative  Forum  and  the  Mercosur  Adimistrative  Secretariat 
(later  the  Comission  of  Permanent  Representatives  of  Mercosur).
5  Monetary 
cooperation between members of Mercosur was established in an indirect way by the 
Treaty of Asunción, which in article 5.b stipulates that macroeconomic coordination is 
                                                 
2  The  complex  co-existence  of  partly  overlapping  bilateral  and  regional  agreements,  creating  important 
administrative costs for the different economic agents has been dubbed the “spaghetti bowl effect” by Bhagwati, 
1995. For a more detailed overview of integration initiatives as well as intra-regional and extra-regional trade 
agreements in Latin America see Vaillant, 2007; Baumann, 2008. 
3 Bolivia and Chile became associate members in 1996, and Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela were added 
in 2003. 
4 See Treaty of Asunción, article 1, March 26, 1991.  
5 The institutional structure of Mercosur was established in the Protocol of Ouro Petro, December 1994. 4 
 
to be attained in a gradual manner. Nevertheless, the Treaty does not establish any 
instruments or provisions to achieve said coordination. In a meeting of the Economics 
and  Finance  ministers  together  with  the  presidents  of  the  central  banks  of  the 
Mercosur countries in 2000, it was agreed that a common compromise regarding fiscal 
solvency  and  monetary  stability  was  needed,  because  Mercosur  had  suffered  from 
recurrent  trade  tensions  among  its  member  countries  that  were  partly  caused  by 
divergent macroeconomic developments and sharp fluctuations in their real exchange 
rates.
6  The  Macroeconomic  Monitoring  Group  (MMG)  was  set  up  in  order  to 
harmonize  the  statistical  data  of  the  different  member  countries  (as  to  make  it 
comparable)  and  to  put  forward  proposals  aimed  at  strengthening  macroeconomic 
coordination like the creation of indicators. The Mercosur countries started publishing 
harmonized indicators regarding fiscal deficit, public debt and inflation.
7 In late 2000, 
the presidents of the member countries made a joined declaration about the approval 
of  common  targets  for  these  variables  and  the  mechanisms  of  macroeconomic 
convergence  that  had  been  previously  established.
8  Since  2004,  the  MMG  has 
established a variety of monetary and financial harmonized indicators, which do not 
have  a  pre-determined  goal  but  where  designed  to  enable  comparative  analysis 
between Mercosur countries.
9 One recent initiative within the Mercosur has been the 
Local Currency Payment System (Sistema de Pagos en Moneda Local - SML), which 
was agreed on in January 2007 in a Presidential Summit of Mercosur. Through the 
SML,  Brazil  and  Argentina  agreed  on  the  use  of  domestic  currencies  for  bilateral 
trade.  This  initiative  is  intended  to  fulfill  a  variety  of  tasks,  for  instance  assist  in 
dealing with the mismatch of bilateral parities with regard to the USD, and also reduce 
transaction costs and thus foster regional trade between the two countries. Uruguay 
and Paraguay have decided to continue using the USD for their transactions, so that 
                                                 
6 See Temprano, 2003, p. 71. 
7 Using these macroeconomic indicators to establish common goals was widely inspired by the convergence 
criteria in the Maastricht Treaty. See Kenen/Meade, 2008, p.133. 
8 The agreed upon goals were a ceiling for public debt of 40 percent of GDP by 2010 (with defined convergence 
paths from 2005 onwards), a ceiling for the fiscal deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP (3 percent from 2004 onwards) 
and a maximum inflation rate of 5 percent for headline inflation (from 2006 onwards 4 percent for headline 
inflation  and  3  percent  for  core  inflation).  For  further  detail  see  Presidential  Declaration  of  Mercosur  on 
Macroeconomic Convergence, Florianopolis, December 15, 2000. 
9 Such indicators are for instance the monetary base and monetary aggregates, as well as statistics concerning 
loans to the private sector. See Termansen, 2010.  5 
 
the initiative has remained essentially a bilateral agreement between Argentina and 
Brazil that started operating in October 2008.
10 
·  The CAN is an association formed in May 1969 by the Cartagena Agreement and its 
members are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Until 1996 it was known as the 
Andean  Pact.  Originally  both  Chile  and  Venezuela  were  member  countries  but  as 
already mentioned, the former left the Community in 1974 and the latter in 2006. 
Associate members are Argentina, Brazil, Chile (that accepted the invitation to re-join 
as an associate), Paraguay and Uruguay. Observer members are Mexico and Panama. 
The main objective of the CAN is to establish a customs union and in the long-run a 
common market.
11 The collective of bodies and institutions of the CAN is the so-
called Andean Integration System, which comprises the Andean Presidential Council; 
the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the Commission of the Andean 
Community; the General Secretariat of the Andean Community; the Court of Justice 
of the Andean Community; the Andean Parliament; the Business Advisory Council; 
the  Labor  Advisory  Council;  the  Andean  Development  Corporation  and  the  Latin 
American  Reserve  Fund  (FLAR).
12  Regarding  explicit  monetary  cooperation  the 
Cartagena Agreement called for the harmonization of monetary  and exchange  rate 
policies
13, and also established the FLAR as the financial institution of the region in 
article  45.
14  In  1997,  the  CAN  set  up  the  so-called  Advisory  Council  of  Finance 
Ministers, Central Bank Presidents and Economic Planning Officers that had the task 
to  develop  a  procedural  framework  for  further  coordination  of  macroeconomic 
policies in the region.
15 In 2001, this Council defined macroeconomic convergence 
criteria on inflation, the fiscal deficit and public debt, and also established a permanent 
technical group to monitor the realisation of these goals.
16 There have been no further 
relevant attempts at macroeconomic and specifically monetary policy cooperation in 
                                                 
10 See Convenio del Sistema de Pagos en Moneda Local entre la República de Argentina y la República Federal 
del Brasil, September 2008. 
11 See Cartagena Agreement, article 1, May 26, 1969. 
12 See Cartagena Agreement, article 6, May 26, 1969. 
13 See Cartagena Agreement, article 51 and 54, May 26, 1969. 
14 The FLAR was originally created as the Andean Reserve Fund with the objectives of providing financing 
support in the case of balance of payments difficulties, assisting in the management of foreign exchange reserves 
and contributing in the harmonization of monetary, exchange rate and financial policies of the member states. In 
1978 the Andean Reserve Fund changed its name to the current FLAR in order to be able to include member 
countries outside of the CAN. See Chang, 2000; Ponsot, 2009.  
15 This was done at the IX meeting of the Presidential Council in April 1997.  
16 The agreed convergence objectives of the CAN for each member state, which where also inspired by the 
Maastricht criteria, where a single digit inflation rate, a ceiling for the fiscal deficit of 3 percent of the GDP and a 
ceiling of 50 percent of GDP for the public debt. See Temprano, 2003, p.70 for further detail. 6 
 
the CAN, which has recently experienced severe strain in its integration prospects due 
to  the  leaving  of  Venezuela  and  the  political  divergence  between  its  remaining 
member states.
17 
·  Following the signing of a free trade agreement by the two largest trading blocs of the 
region,  Mercosur  and  the  Andean  Community,  together  with  Chile,  Guyana  and 
Suriname; the Cusco Declaration created the South American Community of Nations 
(CASA)  in  2004,  which  became  UNASUR  in  2007.
18  The  Constitutive  Treaty  of 
UNASUR was signed in May 2008 and the Union counts as its members Argentina, 
Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Guyana,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Suriname, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.
19 UNASUR represents a new type of regionalism model that 
is not focused predominantly on trade issues, since the general objective of UNASUR, 
established by the Constitutive Treaty, is to build a space for integration and union 
among its people in the cultural, social, economic as well as the political field.
20 The 
institutional bodies of UNASUR are the Council of Heads of State and Government, 
the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Delegates and the General 
Secretariat.
21 Regarding monetary and financial cooperation, the Constitutive Treaty 
of UNASUR establishes the specific objectives of financial integration through the 
adoption of mechanisms compatible with the economic and fiscal policies of Member 
States (article 3f), as well as economic and commercial cooperation (article 3l), but 
does not stipulate any specific measures to promote monetary cooperation between the 
UNASUR  countries.  In  2007  Venezuela  proposed  the  creation  of  the  Bank  of  the 
South which was conceived as a development bank to provide financing for economic 
and  social  projects  within  the  UNASUR  region  and  was  officially  established  in 
September  2009  with  the  signing  of  an  agreement  for  participation  by  Argentina, 
Brazil,  Paraguay,  Uruguay,  Ecuador,  Bolivia  and  Venezuela.
22  Another  recently 
proposed  initiative  is  the  “Ecuadorian  Proposal  for  a  New  Regional  Financial 
Architecture”, which was a direct response to the global financial crisis and advises 
                                                 
17 See Espinosa, 2008, p. 50-51. 
18 See Bennett, 2008. 
19 Note that UNASUR, together with LAIA are the two integration processes that comprise all South American 
countries. 
20 See Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR, article 2, May 23, 2008. See also Baumann, 2008. 
21 See Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR, article 2, May 23, 2008 
22 The Bank of the South is established with an initial authorized capital of 20 billion USD and a subscribed 
capital of 7 billion USD by the participating countries. Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil contribute 2 billion 
each, Uruguay and Ecuador 400 million each, and Bolivia and Paraguay 100 million each. See SELA, 2009, p. 
59-63. 7 
 
not only the strengthening of the Bank of the South as an alternative development 
bank, but also the creation of a Common Reserve Fund and a Regional Monetary 
Agreement linked to the issue of Regional Drawing Rights and an electronic regional 
currency.
23 
·  The Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America (ALBA) is an initiative that 
was originally proposed by Venezuela as an alternative integration process to the US-
led  FTAA  and  officially  created  through  the  signing  of  a  bilateral  agreement  by 
Venezuela  and  Cuba  in  December  2004.
24  Since  then  there  have  been  various 
accession rounds and two modifications to the original name of the integration scheme 
to reflect the institutional development. With the joining of Bolivia in April 2006 the 
denomination People’s Trade Agreement (TCP for the Spanish initials) was added and 
in  June  2009  the  initial  term  “Alternative”  was  replaced  by  “Alliance”.
25  Official 
members of ALBA-TCP are Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Antigua 
& Barbuda, Dominica and St Vincent & Grenadines. Honduras joined ALBA-TCP in 
October 2008 but withdrew again through a Honduran Congress decision in January 
2010,  following  the  political  disturbances  in  that  country.
26  ALBA-TCP  was 
conceived to promote integration in Latin America in the political, economic, social, 
cultural  and  environmental  areas  and  has  established  institutional  bodies  for  this 
purpose,  like  Ministerial  Councils  to  the  different  subjects,  the  Council  of  Social 
Movements, the Permanent Political Commission and a variety of committees and 
working groups.
27 In regard to monetary and financial cooperation, ALBA-TCP has 
launched ambitious initiatives in its short existence, like the Bank of ALBA, that was 
created  in  January  2008  as  a  development  bank  and  possible  alternative  financial 
institution to the IMF and World Bank
28, as well as the ALBA-Caribbean Fund, which 
is a structural convergence fund aimed to assist in reducing regional asymmetries and 
finance infrastructure projects.
29 Another initiative is the Unitary System of Regional 
                                                 
23  See  Páez,  2008.  The  “Ecuadorian  Proposal  for  a  New  Regional  Financial  Architecture”  is  an  initiative 
promoted by the Ecuadorian government as well as the Bank of the South, and will be further described in the 
next section.  
24 See Altmann, 2009, p. 2. 
25 The VI Declaration of the Summit of ALBA-TCP, Maracay, June 24, 2009 establishes the new official name 
as “Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America-Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos”. See SELA, 
2009, p. 50-51. 
26 See El Financiero, “Abandona Honduras el ALBA”, January 12, 2010. 
27 For further detail on the institutional framework of ALBA-TCP see Altmann, 2009; as well as SELA, 2009. 
28 The starting capital for the Bank of ALBA was set at 1 billion USD, and Venezuela has asked its partners to 
divert their international reserves from the US to the Bank of ALBA. See Baumann, 2008, p. 18. 
29 See Romero, 2010, p. 9-13. 8 
 
Compensation (SUCRE), which was conceived as an element of a regional monetary 
zone during the III Summit of ALBA-TCP in November 2008 and officially created 
with the SUCRE Constitutive Treaty signed by Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba, 
Nicaragua (and Honduras) in October 2009. Within the SUCRE, the identically named 
“sucre”  is  intended  to  serve  as  a  virtual  currency  unit  for  intra-regional  trade 
transactions between participating countries and to be at the center of the regional 
clearing system (Cámara Central de Compensación de Pagos), which is designed to 
allow a multilateral offsetting of liabilities and assets generated in the reciprocal trade 
transactions.
30 The SUCRE agreement stipulates that Non-ALBA-TCP countries are 
invited to join the SUCRE and start a process of “decoupling” from the USD as means 
of transaction.
31 The first transactions in sucre units were conducted in early 2010 
between Venezuela and Cuba.
32 Within the “Proposal for a New Regional Financial 
Architecture”, Ecuador has also put forward the possibility of adopting the sucre as the 
currency  unit  for  the  Regional  Monetary  Agreement.
33  While  these  described 
initiatives  are  all  significant  steps  towards  deepening  monetary  cooperation  in  the 
region, it remains unclear how they will develop, since ALBA-TCP is the integration 
model most reliant on the political affinity of the current heads of state of its member 
countries. 
2.2  Plans of Monetary Unification and Alternatives 
As described in the last section, there are a variety of initiatives for the development of further 
monetary and financial cooperation in Latin America. While the relatively older economic 
integration  schemes  Mercosur  and  CAN  have  to  a  degree  stagnated  in  this  regard,  new 
impulses are being provided by two recently created and more political connoted integration 
processes, namely UNASUR and ALBA-TCP. Prompted by these developments, the plan for 
a  common  currency  in  the  region  has  again  become  popular,  as  various  South  American 
presidents have proposed this goal. Alan García, President of Peru, has put forth the idea of a 
common  currency  and  citizenship  in  UNASUR
34,  while  the  Ecuadorian  President,  Rafael 
Correa,  has  proposed  that  a  common  currency  for  the  whole  of  South  America  could  be 
                                                 
30 See Constitutive Treaty of the Unitary System of Regional Compensation (SUCRE), Cochabamba, October 
17, 2009. Also SELA, 2009, p. 52-55. 
31 See SELA, 2009, p. 55; Macro Agreement of the SUCRE, April 16/17, 2009. 
32 See Romero, 2010, p. 9.  
33 See IADE interview with P. Páez, President of the Presidential Technical Commission of Ecuador for the New 
Financial Architecture, December 17, 2009.  
34 See EL Comercio, “García plantea ciudadania y moneda común en Unasur”, May 23, 2008. 9 
 
established through the Bank of the South.
35 The Presidents of Bolivia and Venezuela, Evo 
Morales  and  Hugo  Chávez,  have  also  on  several  occasions  confirmed  their  intention  of 
pursuing the creation of a monetary union for ALBA-TCP and South America based on the 
sucre.  Lula  da  Silva,  President  of  Brazil,  has  stated  interest  in  a  common  currency  for 
UNASUR as well as one for Brazilian-Argentinean bilateral trade, which has been a project 
within Mercosur since 1997, when it was proposed by the Presidents at that time Enrique 
Cardoso and Carlos Menem.
36 
While it is not the aim of this paper to asses the long-term advisability of the politically 
desired pursuit of full monetary unification in Latin America, but rather to accept this political 
desire and analyse a possible intermediate (or alternative) step towards its realization, it will 
nevertheless be useful to briefly describe the main economic benefits a monetary union could 
provide  for  Latin  America,  since  several  are  shared  with  the  exchange  rate  system  later 
detailed in this paper.
37  
The main argument for irrevocably fixing the exchange rates of the participating countries in 
a Latin American Monetary Union (LMU) would be the resulting elimination of the exchange 
rate risks and exchange-related transaction costs in intra-regional trade. This would reduce the 
costs for private companies, facilitate cost accounting of intra-regional trade and improve the 
overall  investment  climate  in  the  region.  Furthermore  a  single  currency  would  prevent 
competitive devaluations (i.e. beggar-thy-neighbour strategies) as well as eliminate currency 
speculation within the region. The introduction of a single currency would also increase price 
transparency  and  could  therefore  encourage  competition  and  growth.  Finally,  a  common 
currency  for  the  region  could  serve  as  a  catalyst  for  financial  market  integration,  thus 
fostering growth and contributing in the creation of a larger single market that could provide 
greater scope for absorbing external shocks. 
Despite  these  benefits  there  is  a  large  body  of  economic  literature  that  concludes  that  a 
common currency for Latin America (or for one of the specific integration arrangements like 
Mercosur or CAN) is remarkably undesirable for the time being. This literature is mainly 
based on the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), pioneered by Mundell (1961), which 
establishes  criteria  relevant  for  a  region  to  effectively  adopt  a  single  currency.  Mundell 
establishes  the  criterion  of  factor  mobility  between  the  countries  in  a  monetary  union  as 
                                                 
35 See Pagina/12, “Correa quiere moneda común”, December 11, 2007. 
36 See Kronberger, 2001, p. 2; La Nacion, “Impulsan una moneda única para Brasil y la Argentina”, January 15, 
2003. 
37 The briefly described benefits of monetary union are mainly taken from De Grauwe, 2005, which should be 
consulted for further detail and assessment of these benefits. 10 
 
necessary in order to offset the inability of these countries to pursue independent adjustment 
policies in the face of asymmetrically distributed shocks. Other criteria are for instance trade 
openness and trade interdependence among the countries (Mckinnon, 1963), as well as the 
degree  of  product  or  industry  diversification  of  a  country  (Kenen  1969).  Regarding  the 
analysis for  Latin America, De Grauwe (2005)  lists three different factors that determine 
whether  a  monetary  union  would  be  suitable  for  the  region:  the  degree  of  economic 
integration  between  the  prospective  members  of  the  union,  the  degree  to  which  these 
countries’ economies are subject to asymmetric shocks and the degree of flexibility in the 
labor markets. De Grauwe (2005, p. 110-112) concludes that Latin America is far from being 
an OCA. Other studies are for instance Hochreiter et al. (2002), who add the precondition of a 
sound financial sector to the analysis and find that Latin America is currently unsuited for 
monetary  union;  or  Kronberger  (2001),  who  focuses  on  Mercosur  and  determines  a  low 
degree of trade openness and integration, as well as a low level of labor mobility that would 
not sufficiently compensate for asymmetric shocks in the case of a currency union. Similar 
results are given by Calderon et al. (2003) and Larrain/Tavares (2005), who indicate that the 
degree of synchronization of output movements is still quite low in the region.
38 Furthermore, 
Edwards (2006) states that the prerequisites for joining a currency union may have increased 
to include the following (in addition to those mentioned above): different (or diversified) 
composition of output and trade across countries, price and wage flexibility across members 
of the union, similar inflation rates across countries, absence of “fiscal dominance” in the 
individual countries, as well as low – and similar – levels of public-sector debt in the different 
countries. All these studies state the unsatisfactory degree of economic integration and policy 
coordination in the region, which leads to a high susceptibility in regard to external financial 
and  economic  shocks  and,  according  to  the  authors,  makes  full  monetary  unification 
unfeasible in the near future. 
Nevertheless, the general argument for a stabilization of intra-regional exchange rates remains 
valid, since a large number of studies attribute the lack of trade and financial integration to the 
high degree of exchange rate volatility in the region, which is partly caused by the instability 
                                                 
38 Other Studies that find insufficient evidence for monetary union viability are for instance Cardim, 2004, who 
analyses the possibility of a Brazilian-Argentinean single currency; Espinosa, 2008, who analyses monetary 
union for both Mercosur and CAN and proposes dollarization as an alternative; Peña/Flores, 2006, for CAN; 
Foresti,  2007,  for  whole  Latin  America;  Berg  et  al.,  2002,  propose  dollariztion;  Arestis  et  al.,  2002,  for 
Mercosur. 11 
 
of  the  USD  (see  Figure  1).
39  The  volatility  of  bilateral  exchange  rates  does  not  only 
undermine intra-regional trade, but can also exacerbate political tensions within the specific 
integration  schemes  due  to  abrupt  changes  in  competitiveness.
40  The  proposal  of  intra-
regional exchange rate stabilization through coordination is also in line with the literature on 
the endogeneity of the OCA criteria which argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom 
of OCA theory (i.e. that countries would only consider a common currency if they showed 
high levels of economic integration), there is reason to believe that exchange rate coordination 
and  a  step  forward  in  the  direction  of  monetary  union  could  endogenously  encourage 
economic integration within the region.
41 While it might be too early to viably establish a 
monetary union in Latin America due to economic (and possibly also political) reasons, a 
regional  exchange  rate  fluctuation  band  system  could  provide  the  exchange  rate  stability 
needed to encourage trade and at the same time allow for the possibility of monetary and 
exchange  rate  policy  adjustments  in  accordance  with  the  macroeconomic  differences  still 
present between member states.
42 Thus, setting up such a system could not only provide an 
effective option for an intermediate step towards monetary integration, but also a possible 
long-term alternative if sufficient convergence for full monetary unification is not reached. 
Several authors propose variations of this type regional exchange rate mechanism as a gradual 
approach towards monetary union or at least further monetary integration, which would be 
fairly similar to the European Monetary System that was adopted as an intermediate step in 
the European monetary integration process.
43 The already mentioned “Ecuadorian Proposal 
for a New Regional Financial Architecture” also follows this line of thought and aims at 
setting up a Regional Exchange Rate Mechanism for Latin America in the medium-term.
44 
While  all  these  sources  champion  the  general  possible  benefits  of  establishing  a  regional 
exchange rate mechanism for Latin America and recommend its implementation, they do not 
discuss two important aspects in need of analysis before such steps should be taken. These 
                                                 
39  See  Bersch,  2002;  Scandizzo,  2003;  Medina,  2004;  Arize  et  al.,  2005;  Moccero/Winograd,  2005; 
Machinea/Rozenwurcel, 2005; Ugarteche, 2008; Campos, 2009. 
40 See Machinea/Rozenwurcel, 2005, p. 45-46. 
41 See Frankel/Rose, 1998; Rose, 2000; Rajan, 2002; Fritz/Mühlich, 2006; Agénor/Aizenman, 2008. 
42 See Ugarteche, 2008, p. 21. 
43 Authors that propose a possible regional exchange rate arrangement in line with the type of a exchange rate 
fluctuation  band  system  analysed  in  this  paper  are  for  example  Medina,  2004;  Moccero/Winograd,  2005; 
Machinea/Rozenwurcel, 2005; Ugarteche, 2008; Campos, 2009; Bresser-Pereira/Holland, 2009. Note also the 
large body of literature discussing similar fixed rate systems for the East Asian integration process. While the 
macroeconomic conditions of East Asia and Latin America might widely differ, the literature on the subject 
nevertheless  sheds  light  on  the  economic  rationale  behind  the  implementation  of  a  regional  exchange  rate 
mechanism. See for instance Williamson, 2005; Murase, 2007; Chey, 2008; Chai, 2010. 
44 See Páez, 2008. 12 
 
are, 1) how the institutional framework (and its constitutive elements ) of such an exchange 
rate  arrangement  between  countries  could  be  designed,  i.e.  what  different  basic  choices 
regarding the institutional features of the system would have to be considered and made by 
policymakers; and 2) how the mechanism might actually function in reality depending on its 
agreed upon institutional design. Thus, and in accordance with the stated primary aim of this 
paper to provide a detailed look at an optional intermediate step towards monetary unification 
in Latin America, the next two chapters of this paper are intended to shed a light on both these 
issues that are of central relevance for the practical design and implementation of a regional 
exchange rate arrangement. The third chapter of this paper will provide a detailed analysis of 
regional exchange rate  systems from an institutional perspective and present the different 
design elements policymakers will have to decide upon before implementation, since these 
essentially determine the overall functioning of the system. Chapter four will then take an in-
depth look at one of the most relevant regional exchange rate arrangements in recent history, 
the  European  Monetary  System,  in  order  to  analyse  how  such  a  system  with  a  specific 
institutional design might actually work, whether or not it was successful and what lessons 
can be learned from the European experience on the road towards monetary union. 
 
3  Fixed Exchange Rate Systems: An Institutional Analysis 
3.1  Overview 
The aim of this chapter of the paper is to provide a general analysis of fixed exchange rate 
arrangements between various sovereign countries from an institutional perspective.
45 This 
type of international/regional arrangement, that has the main objective of providing exchange 
rate stability for its participating countries, will be referred to in broad terms as a fixed rate 
system and specified by its institutional features. 
Since  the  institutional  design  of  fixed  rate  systems  has,  throughout  history,  essentially 
remained an issue of practical policy, the available economic literature that is concerned with 
the theoretical analysis of the basic institutional and systemic aspects of fixed rate systems is 
very scarce. While there is a large array of theoretical and empirical work that deals with 
specific historic fixed rate systems (e.g. the Bretton Woods System or the EMS) and analyzes 
the implications of the agreed upon rules for the member countries, the authors that address 
                                                 
45 An institution  within the context of this paper is defined in a broad sense as  “the rules […] or devised 
constraints that shape […] interaction”, see North, 1991, p. 3. 13 
 
the general nature of institutionalized fixed rate systems and their constitutive features are 
very  few.
46  Furthermore,  the  vast  existing  literature  on  exchange  rate  target  zones
47  (or 
“currency bands”), which share various institutional elements with the general type of fixed 
rate  system  analyzed  in  this  paper,  also  offers  little  guide  on  the  institutional  choices 
policymakers have to make in order to implement such a system, but  rather  assumes the 
institutional  framework  (e.g.  the  existence  of  the  fluctuation  band,  its  width,  etc.)  as 
exogenous.
48 
Thus, it is one of the intentions of this paper to contribute in filling this void in economic 
literature and provide a comprehensive analysis of the institutional design choices available to 
policymakers  when  creating  an  international/regional  fixed  exchange  rate  system  that  can 
possibly serve as an intermediate step towards eventual full monetary integration. Following 
this basic premise, section 3.2 will first describe some general aspects regarding symmetry 
and policy coordination in fixed rate systems, after which section 3.3 will then provide a 
detailed analysis of possible design options for the institutional framework and also a short 
typology of different design configurations for the system. In section 3.4 the relevance and 
effects of the size of a country participating in the system will be detailed. Finally, in section 
3.5  a  summary  of  the  overall  functioning  and  resulting  adjustment  constraints  of  the 
institutional design of the fixed rate system will be provided. 
3.2  General Aspects and Policy Coordination 
An institutionalized fixed rate system is established by its inherent economic mechanics and 
functioning, the so called “rules of the game”.
49 The “rules of the game” describe the effects 
and adjustment constraints on the member countries of a fixed rate system, which are a direct 
result of the system’s institutional design structure interacting with the prevailing conditions 
of  the  capital  and  foreign  exchange  markets.  The  institutional  framework  of  the  system, 
established  by  the  basic  set  of  regulatory  features  and  their  specific  design,  therefore 
                                                 
46 Because of the scarcity of relevant literature, the basic design choices regarding the institutional framework of 
fixed rate systems that are described in this paper stem from the works of Miller et al. (1989) and McKinnon 
(1993), which attempt to provide systemic comparative analysis’ of fixed rate systems, and especially from 
Bofinger (1991) as well as Vehrkamp (1995), who generally adopts Bofinger’s terminology and basic elements. 
47 The “target zone” concept is coined and developed by Williamson (1985) and later adopted and theoretically 
formalized by the standard model of Krugman (1991). For comprehensive surveys of target zone work see 
Krugman/Miller (1992) and Kempa/Nelles (1999)  
48 Exceptions, which are also used for the institutional analysis of fixed rate systems attempted in this paper, are 
for example Williamson (1985), Frenkel/Goldstein (1986) and Williamson/Miller (1987). 
49 This terminology is originally attributed to J.M. Keynes (1925, p.220), who describes the monetary adjustment 
measures of the Bank of England as the “rules of the gold standard game”. See also McKinnon, 1993, who uses 
the term to systematically describe the economic mechanics of historical fixed rate systems. 14 
 
determines the system’s symmetry characteristics (i.e. the allocation of monetary adjustment 
pressures  among  the  participating  countries  resulting  from  the  commitment  to  create 
exchange rate stability). A fixed rate system can be designed to asymmetrically burden either 
the strong currency countries (i.e. the countries whose currencies revalue beyond the allowed 
scope  of  the  system’s  rules)  or  the  weak  currency  countries  (i.e.  the  countries  whose 
currencies devalue beyond the allowed scope of the system’s rules) or to be symmetrical in 
the distribution of adjustment constraints.
50 While the symmetry criterion is used throughout 
the following analysis of the institutional framework of fixed rate systems to describe the 
distribution of macroeconomic effects generated by the individual institutional features, it is 
only through the interaction of all the specific symmetry characteristics of these individual 
rule components that the overall symmetry characteristics of the system are determined. 
While the basic function of a fixed exchange rate system is the stabilization of exchange rates, 
it also serves as a mechanism that provides a coordination structure for the national monetary 
policies  of  member  states.
51  This  coordination  can  occur  indirectly,  through  the  policy 
adjustment  constraints  established  by  the  basic  institutional  rules  and  framework  of  the 
system,  and/or  also  through  a  direct  coordination  of  policy  measures  by  the  system’s 
participating  countries  intended  to  achieve  the  monetary  convergence  necessary  for  the 
stabilization of the exchange rate relations.
52 Although this paper focuses mainly on the basic 
institutionally established rules that constitute fixed rate systems in general and which lead to 
a primarily indirect coordination of policy through the adjustment constraints of the system, it 
cannot be denied, that a certain amount of direct coordination between member countries 
might prove indispensable in order to successfully manage a regional fixed rate system. This 
necessity is shown in chapter 4 of this paper, which details the functioning of a specific fixed 
rate system, the EMS. 
3.3  Basic Institutional Features 
A  fixed  exchange  rate  system  is  constituted  by  a  set  of  rules,  intended  to  stabilize  the 
exchange rate fluctuations of the system’s member currencies within a predetermined band. 
For  each  of  these  basic  regulatory  features,  which  together  constitute  the  institutional 
framework  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate  system,  there  are  several  possible  design  options. 
                                                 
50 See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 11. 
51 See Bofinger, 1988, p. 317. 
52  See  Bofinger,  1991,  who  differentiates  between  “simple  fixed  rate  systems”  that  trigger  merely  indirect 
monetary policy coordination, and “complex fixed rate systems” that establish mechanisms for direct monetary 
policy coordination.  15 
 
Therefore an assessment of the mechanics and working of the system as a whole can only be 
made once the specific rules of the system are established, since certain types of intervention 
rules  can  have  varying  effects  on  the  macroeconomic  adjustment  constraints  and  their 
symmetry when combined with different types of financing rules for said interventions. In the 
following  subsections,  the  general  institutional  features  and  the  alternatives  for  their 
respective design will be described. Subsection 2.3.5 will then present a short overview of 
different types of fixed exchange systems that are constituted by a specific combination of 
feature arrangements.
53 
3.3.1  Intervention Rules 
The intervention rules of the fixed exchange rate system establish the mechanism and the 
circumstances under which the participating central banks commit to intervene in the foreign 
exchange  market  in  order  to  stabilize  exchange  rates.  Before  the  different  institutional 
features, which together establish the intervention rules, are described, some basic aspects 
regarding foreign market interventions that are relevant in the scope of this paper must be 
noted. A central element in this analysis is the assumption that foreign market interventions 
can effectively influence the exchange rate.
54 Given this premise, once a country performs an 
intervention in the foreign exchange market in order to influence the market exchange rate, 
two different effects result: 
·  Liquidity effects that are determined by the changes in the countries’ monetary bases, 
which  result  from  selling/buying  currencies  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  For 
instance, if a country intervenes by selling its own currency A on the foreign exchange 
market against currency B assets, this transaction has an expansionary effect on its 
own monetary base and at the same time reduces the monetary base of the country 
issuing currency B.
55 Identical liquidity effects result if country B purchases its own 
currency by providing its currency A reserves to the market. 
·  Reserve effects, defined as changes in the foreign exchange reserves of a country due 
to intervention. By acquiring currency B assets against its own currency, country A 
increases its foreign exchange reserves. The reserves of country B on the other hand 
                                                 
53 The described features of fixed exchange rate system as well as the terminology are mainly borrowed from 
Bofinger, 1991. 
54  While  this  premise  is  not  uncontested  in  economic  literature,  see  for  instance  Schwartz,  2000;  it  is  still 
consistent with recent empirical studies, see Fatum/Hutchison, 2002; Fatum/Hutchison, 2003; as well as the 
literature on managed floating, see for instance Bofinger/Wollmershäuser, 2001. 
55 Note that the liquidity effects may vary depending on how the purchased or sold assets were previously 
invested. See section 3.3.3. 16 
 
decrease if it intervenes by buying its own currency against its previously accumulated 
currency A reserves. 
The distribution of the liquidity and reserve effects resulting from institutionally established 
intervention  obligations,  as  well  as  the  adjustment  constraints  for  the  member  countries 
resulting from these effects, is a main aspect in the analysis of the functioning of the exchange 
rate mechanism stipulated by the institutional framework of the fixed rate system. Thus, the 
intervention  rules  are,  together  with  the  institutional  features  designed  to  finance 
interventions, the core of the exchange rate mechanism of the fixed rate system. These rules 
are  configured  by  the  design  choices  concerning  the  exchange  rate  standard,  the  central 
parities, the width of the fluctuation band and the intervention points. 
3.3.1.1  Exchange Rate Standard 
The  choice  regarding  the  type  of  exchange  rate  standard  under  which  the  system’s 
intervention  rules  operate,  has  crucial  implications  regarding  which  of  the  participating 
central  banks  is  obliged  to  intervene.  While  the  resulting  distribution  of  intervention 
obligations between the member countries influences the general symmetry of the fixed rate 
system, an opposing composition of the fluctuation band width and/or the intervention points 
can  still  (over-)  compensate  this  influence,  and  therefore  change  the  overall  adjustment 
constraints for the system’s participants. Nevertheless, the choice of the standard implies an 
important initial indication of the intended symmetry characteristics for the system.
56 There 
are three possible design options for the exchange rate standard: 
·  The first option is the so-called key currency standard, which is characterized by each 
of the n-1 participating countries establishing a bilateral rate of their currency towards 
the (n-th) key currency and having to defend this parity (with an allowed degree of 
fluctuation  within  pre-established  intervention  margins)  through  foreign  exchange 
market interventions. It is evident that under this institutional premise only the non-
key  currencies  can  reach  the  intervention  points  and  be  subject  to  compulsory 
interventions,  since  the  key-currency  cannot,  by  definition,  deviate  from  its  own 
(implicit) parity.
57 Due to this passive role, the key currency country is not affected by 
any monetary adjustment constraints that could result from the liquidity and reserve 
effects  due  to  being  forced  to  intervene  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  The  key 
currency standard is therefore by design inherently asymmetrical, because the (n-1) 
                                                 
56 See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 15. 
57 See Bofinger, 1991, p. 93-94. 17 
 
non-key  currencies  are  burdened  with  the  entirety  of  the  intervention  obligations, 
while  the  (n-th)  key  currency  is  institutionally  guaranteed  by  rule  the  remaining 
monetary degree of freedom.
58 Furthermore, in a key currency standard the implicit 
fluctuation  bands  between  fellow  non-key  currencies  are  twice  as  wide  as  the 
fluctuation  band  institutionally  established  for  a  non-key-currency  around  the  key 
currency parity.
59 
·  In the second type of exchange rate standard, each member country establishes fixed 
parities for its currency toward every other currency of the system, thus creating a so-
called bilateral parity grid. With n currencies participating, this results in n(n-1)/2 
bilaterally  established  central  rates  that  have  to  be  defended  through  mandatory 
interventions, due to the fact that every currency commits to stabilize its bilateral rates 
vis-à-vis all other member currencies, not just one key currency.
60 Thus, in contrast to 
the key currency standard, in a parity grid standard all participant currencies formally 
posses an equal status in the fixed rate system. A system using a bilateral parity grid 
is, at least in a formal sense, expected to be characterized by a symmetric distribution 
of intervention obligations between  countries with strong and countries  with weak 
currencies, since the construction of bilateral central rates entails that a weak currency 
reaching its lower fluctuation margin automatically means the strong currency is at its 
upper margin.
61 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the de facto characteristics of the 
system regarding the symmetry of adjustment constraints also depend on the design of 
the remaining institutional features. 
·  A  third  possible  option  is  using  a  currency  basket  as  the  standard  for  the  central 
parities in the fixed rate system.
62 A currency basket is composed by fixed absolute 
amounts of all participating currencies
63, therefore assigning each currency a certain 
weight in the basket, which can for example be based on the relative economic size of 
                                                 
58 See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 15. 
59 For formal prove see Bofinger, 1991, p. 200-202. 
60 See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 16. 
61 See Bofinger, 1991, p. 96. 
62 In order to better describe the basic mechanics and symmetry effects of the currency basket standard it is 
hereafter  assumed,  that  the  basket  is  solely  composed  of  currencies  participating  in  the  fixed  rate  system, 
although different types of compositions are obviously conceivable. For instance a basket composition that also 
includes the currencies of major trading partners that do not participate in the fixed rate system might be a 
possibility. 
63 This type of basket value construction  follows the  “standard basket technique”,  used for example in the 
conception of the European Monetary Unit or the SDR of the IMF. Other methods like the “adjustable basket 
technique”  or  the  “asymmetrical  basket  technique”  are  also  conceivable,  for  further  detail  see  Sommer-
Herberich, 1983, 325-329.  18 
 
the currency’s country in the system. Since a currency’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
basket currency is the weighted average of its bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
individual currencies participating in the basket, it follows that whenever a bilateral 
exchange of two currencies in the basket change, their relative weight changes and the 
exchange rate of the basket currency against all participating currencies changes as 
well.
64 This makes the implications for the symmetry characteristics of a currency 
basket standard, regarding the intervention obligations, a lot more complex than those 
of the other standards, since it is possible that contradictory exchange rate fluctuations 
of an individual currency towards other  currencies in the system compensate each 
other and consequently are not reflected in its basket rate. In general, the distribution 
of the intervention obligations in a currency basket standard primarily burdens those 
currencies which deviate the most from the average (of all participating currencies), 
defined by the basket composition, because these reach their compulsory intervention 
points earlier than currencies that follow an “average exchange rate trend”.
65 Also, 
currencies  with  a  relatively  small  weight  in  the  basket  can  fluctuate  more  before 
reaching their intervention rate, since their impact on the basket parity is smaller.
66 
Another  particularity  of  a  currency  basket  standard  lies  in  the  fact  that,  assuming 
identical  exchange  rate  fluctuations  and  band  widths,  the  intervention  margins  are 
reached at a much later point in time compared to the key currency and parity grid 
standards. This is due to the fact that a depreciation (or appreciation) of a member 
currency vis-à-vis all other basket currencies is only partially mirrored in its basket 
rate, the degree of which is dependent upon the weight the currency counts for in the 
basket. Thus, the implicit fluctuation bands around the bilateral cross-rates between 
member currencies are wider than the established band of the individual currencies 
around the central parity towards the basket currency.
67 
3.3.1.2  Central Parities 
The second necessary design detail of the intervention rules concerns the establishing of the 
central parities. Regardless of which type of exchange rate standard is chosen, it is imperative 
for the design of the fixed rate system to explicitly establish the level at which the bilateral 
central parities will be set. The central parities can be decided upon by using a variety of 
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possible  normative  models  to  define  the  “correct”  equilibrium  exchange  rates
68,  although 
none is completely unproblematic, or by referring to a “consensus forecast”, consisting of the 
average  of  the  results  obtained  from  different  estimation  procedures.
69  Alternatively  the 
central rates can be established by simply adopting the given bilateral market rates at the time 
of the fixed rate system’s inception. 
A fixed rate system can also establish rules that allow and stipulate adjustments of the central 
parities in order to avoid misaligned central rates due to changes in the real macroeconomic 
conditions of member countries; section 2.3.4 describes how such a central rate adjustment 
mechanism can be designed. 
Furthermore,  it  is  assumed  that  in  order  to  create  transparency  and  to  stabilize  market 
expectations, the central parities (as well as the entire institutional framework of the system) 
of the fixed rate system are announced to the public.
70 
3.3.1.3  Width of the Fluctuation Band 
Another important institutional aspect of the intervention rules that has to be defined, is the 
width of the fluctuation band of the fixed rate system. The band width establishes the margins 
around the central parity within which the exchange rates of the participating currencies can 
fluctuate freely. Therefore, the choice regarding the width of the fluctuation band equals the 
choice about how much the exchange rate flexibility should be restricted by the fixed rate 
system.
71 The band should be wide enough to accommodate short-run disturbances that do not 
alter long-run equilibrium real exchange rates.
72 A too narrow fluctuation band would lack an 
adequate “buffer” that “not only guards against costly shifts in resources due to excessively 
frequent changes in central rates but also provides the authorities with breathing space to sort 
out permanent from transitory shocks” (Frenkel/Goldstein, 1986, p. 40-41). Generally, there 
are several reasons as to why accommodating these transitory shocks within the band margins 
is preferable to central rate realignment: to avoid giving the market misleading signals for 
resource  allocation,  to  avoid  lessening  the  market  confidence  in  the  probability  of  an 
impending rebound of the exchange rate, and to allow for an instantaneous initial adjustment 
                                                 
68 For an overview of exchange rate theories, as well as models and assessments to define equilibrium exchange 
rates, see Isard, 2007.  
69 See Frenkel/Goldstein, 1986, p. 36. 
70 For a discussion on the merits of policy announcement regarding exchange rate bands see Williamson, 2000, 
p. 49-50. Theoretically conceivable alternatives to an announced system, like  for instance the  “quiet band” 
advocated by Goldstein (1995), will not be discussed in the scope of this institutional analysis. 
71 See Pohl, 1985, p. 91. 
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to a shock.
73 How wide the band is required to be to fulfill this purpose, “depends on how 
large the interest rate differentials likely to be needed to provide autonomy of domestic action 
[are]”  (See  Williamson,  1985,  p.  66).  Furthermore,  the  band  should  be  wide  enough  to 
account for the uncertainties that arise, as mentioned above, in calculating and establishing 
the “correct” central parities.
74 Another factor that requires consideration is speculation, since 
a very narrow band is much more vulnerable to exchange rate crises and can make speculation 
regarding the future spot rate a “one-way bet” if the need for a central rate adjustment has 
become  evident.
75  In  order  to  avoid  the  bankable  promise  of  self-fulfilling  “one-way” 
speculation, the margins should be wide enough to allow for the newly adjusted central rate to 
fall within the original band or to provide an overlap of the new and old fluctuation band in 
the case of central rate realignments. Overlapping bands reduce the predictability of the future 
spot rate for speculators, because the new spot rate (within the new band) does not necessarily 
have to lie outside the margins of the old band.
76 While all of these criteria focus on the 
necessity of choosing a “wide-enough” fluctuation band, it is also obvious that the band is still 
required to be sufficiently narrow, so that the aim of stabilizing exchange rates through the 
fixed rate system remains credible. As noted  earlier while discussing the basket currency 
standard,  it  is  worth  considering,  that  the  established  fluctuation  band  width  around  the 
central parity can be very different from the implicit widths of the bands between the member 
currencies, depending on which exchange rate standard is chosen.
77 Finally, when establishing 
the  fluctuation  margins,  choices  can  be  made  about  whether  or  not  the  band  should  be 
symmetrical (i.e. equal margins around the central parity), the band width should be constant 
over time (i.e. not adjust depending on the nature and frequency of the disturbances) and if the 
band width should be the same for all participating currencies.
78 
3.3.1.4  Intervention Points 
A  crucial  design  element,  which  is  tightly  related  to  the  construction  of  the  fluctuation 
margins for the participating currencies, is the definition of the actual intervention obligations 
(i.e. the specific intervention points) to keep the currencies within the established band. If a 
currency reaches its intervention point, the fixed rate system’s intervention rules are triggered, 
so it has to be specified if the compulsory intervention point will lie at the upper or lower 
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margin of the band, or possibly at both margins. Provided that the commitment to action lies 
at the lower intervention point, which describes the minimum exchange rate of a currency 
within the system, then the country whose currency has devaluated until it has reached its 
lower limit is obliged to intervene in the foreign exchange market by purchasing its own weak 
currency (using its reserves of strong currency), in order to prevent further depreciation. On 
the other hand, if the commitment to action lies at the upper intervention point, which in turn 
describes the maximum rate of a currency within the system, then the strong currency country 
must intervene to prevent further revaluation of its currency by selling it against the weak 
currency.
79 The choice regarding the construction of the intervention points can therefore also 
be seen as the choice regarding whether the strong or the weak (or both) currency’s central 
bank has to intervene in order to keep the system’s currencies within the fluctuation band. 
As noted, the intervention points can be constructed in a symmetrical or asymmetrical way. 
Symmetry  regarding  the  intervention  points  is  given,  if  the  obligation  to  intervene  is 
established for both the upper and lower point of intervention, and if these are set in the same 
distance from the bilaterally defined central parity (i.e. a symmetrical fluctuation band). The 
intervention points can also be constructed in an asymmetrical fashion if the compulsion to 
intervene  exist  exclusively  at  either  the  upper  (  “soft  currency  version”)  or  at  the  lower 
(“strong currency version”) band margin, or if the band is build in an inherently asymmetrical 
way, through differently distanced upper and lower margins from the central rate.
80 Another 
possible  asymmetric  construction  of  the  intervention  points  is  by  establishing  different 
margins (i.e. different band widths) for participating currencies. Finally, it is also theoretically 
conceivable to establish a fluctuation band without creating compulsory intervention points, 
but this type of “monitoring band”- system will not be a part of further analysis within the 
scope of this work.
81 
When considering the construction of a system based on intervention points set at the upper 
margin, lower margin or both margins, it is necessary to determine if such a framework is 
possible/recommendable for the given currency standard of the system. 
For instance, in a system based on a key currency standard, symmetrical intervention points 
should be constructed, since a “one-sided” intervention commitment for the non-key currency 
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(“lower”) fluctuation band margin.  
80 See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 17. 
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country at only the lower (or upper) margin would mean that a revaluation (devaluation) vis-
à-vis the key currency would not be met by any intervention obligation to keep the currency 
within the fluctuation band. Thus, the characteristics of a fixed rate system would merely be 
given in one direction from the central parity.
82 
In the basket standard system, the currencies reach their fluctuation margins at different times 
depending  on  their  weight  in  the  basket  and  how  much  they  deviate  from  the  “basket 
average”.  A  “one-sided”  intervention  obligation  could  therefore  lead  to  a  participating 
currency  crossing  its  established  upper  (or  lower)  margin  long  before  another  currency 
reaches  it  lower  (upper)  compulsory  intervention  point.  As  a  result,  in  a  basket  currency 
standard,  the  intervention  points  should  be  established  for  both  the  upper  and  lower 
fluctuation margin, in order avoid the possibility of a currency (with a small weight in the 
basket) deviating widely from its central parity before a intervention obligation arises for a 
fellow member currency.
83 But even with “two-sided” intervention obligations, a currency 
basket standard has an inherently asymmetrical nature, because, as noted above, currencies 
have different implicit fluctuation margins, depending on their weight in the basket.
84 
Because  of  the  symmetric  structure  of  the  bilateral  parity  grid  standard,  in  which  two 
currencies reach their bilateral margins simultaneously, a construction of both asymmetric 
(upper or lower margin) or symmetric (both margins) intervention obligations is possible in 
order to keep the member currencies’ fluctuation within the pre-established band. 
3.3.1.5  Intramarginal Interventions 
As a final component of the intervention rules of a fixed rate system it has to be established 
whether or not (or under what conditions) the participating countries are allowed to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market while their currencies are still within the fluctuation band and 
have  not  reached  their  mandatory  intervention  points.  These  so-called  intramarginal 
interventions allow member countries to stabilize their exchange rate even before they are 
institutionally compelled to do so and can therefore be used to strengthen the stabilization 
process of the system,  especially if the fluctuation band of the system is very wide.
85  In 
addition  to  this,  intramarginal  interventions  allow  weak  currency  countries,  which  were 
obliged to intervene due to transitory shocks, to replenish their foreign exchange reserves 
                                                 
82 Although such a mixture of a fixed and flexible exchange rate system is certainly theoretically possible it shall 
not be considered in this analysis. See Bofinger, 1991, p. 104-105.  
83 See Bofinger, 1991, p. 105-106. 
84 See Sommer-Herberich, 1983, p. 337-341. 
85 See Bofinger, 2004, p. 11. 23 
 
once  their  currencies  move  within  the  band  again.
86  While  these  are  clear  advantages, 
problems from intramarginal interventions could arise if these are allowed to be performed in 
a discretionary way by member countries, since this would increase the risk that individual 
countries may try to improve their competitiveness by devaluating their currencies through 
interventions or that several countries perform directly opposing intramarginal interventions. 
Also, if country A performs non-coordinated intramarginal interventions in the currency of 
fellow member country B, it could lead to the latter being forced to compulsory intervention 
vis-à-vis a third party’s currency, therefore affecting the systemic adjustment pressure for 
country  B.  Due  to  these  problems,  if  intramarginal  interventions  are  allowed  within  the 
institutionalized fixed rate system, it may be recommendable to stipulate a framework for the 
coordination of intramarginal interventions.
87 Finally, since intramarginal interventions have 
the same liquidity and reserve  effects as mandatory interventions, the fixed rate system’s 
framework  could  also  stipulate  financing  rules  (credit  facilities  and  asset  settlement 
obligations) for intramarginal interventions. 
3.3.2  Intervention Financing Mechanism 
After  defining  the  intervention  rules  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate  system,  it  is  required  to 
establish the corresponding mechanism of intervention financing. While the intervention rules 
dictate the distribution of the intervention obligations and the technical process of intervening 
in the foreign exchange market, the financing rules provide an institutional framework that 
stipulates how the intervention commitments can be upheld through credit and settlement 
rules. Due to the possible random nature of currency crises, it is also necessary to establish 
intervention financing mechanisms in order to avoid a completely accidental and conceivably 
unsustainable distribution of adjustment constraints resulting from the liquidity and reserve 
effects of compulsory foreign market intervention.
88 The design of the financing mechanisms 
can have a decisive impact on the overall symmetry characteristics of the fixed rate system’s 
adjustment obligations. Even if the intervention rules are formally conceived in a symmetrical 
fashion, these can be offset by an asymmetrical design of the corresponding financing rules. 
When analyzing the intervention financing mechanism of a fixed rate system, it has to be 
distinguished between two elements, the credit facilities and the settlement obligations. Even 
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though  both  features  share  similar  design  details,  they  refer  to  very  different  facets  of 
intervention financing and will therefore be described separately. 
3.3.2.1  Credit Facilities 
For a fixed rate system that establishes compulsory interventions at the lower fluctuation 
margin, appropriate credit facilities have to be defined in order to relax the budget constraint 
the weak currency country faces when fulfilling its intervention commitment. The budget 
constraint  results  from  the  fact  that  a  country,  whose  currency  has  reached  its  lower 
intervention point and that is therefore obliged to intervene in the foreign exchange market by 
purchasing its own weak currency and supplying the strong currency to the market, can only 
do this according to the funds of strong currency reserves at its disposal. Because of this 
limited amount of freely available intervention assets, the fixed rate system’s commitment to 
defend a currency’s exchange rate at its lower intervention point can only be perceived as 
credible (from the markets perspective) if the country obliged to intervene is provided with an 
adequate access to intervention assets beyond its strong currency reserves.
89 While the weak 
currency countries can attempt to secure extra intervention assets through the private capital 
markets, the fixed rate system can also create institutionally established credit facilities that 
are able to guarantee an unlimited short-term strong currency intervention potential, which 
can  only  be  provided  by  the  strong  currency’s  central  bank  itself  through  granting  credit 
facilities to the weak currency’s central bank for lower margin interventions. As an alternative 
to a direct credit facility from the strong currency country to the weak currency country, the 
credit mechanism of the system can also be run through a separate institution created by the 
system’s participants for this purpose and endowed with the necessary funds.
90 To which 
extent the budgetary constraint of limited intervention assets is loosened, depends on the way 
that the conditions of the credit facilities of the system are structured. The conditions that 
have to be established are the overall amount and maturity of the credit facility, as well as the 
interest rate and the denomination of the assets used for repayment: 
·  The  agreed  upon  conditions  concerning  the  amount  and  the  maturity  of  the  credit 
facilities granted to the weak currency country have a determining effect on the overall 
credibility of the intervention commitment at the lower intervention point. From the 
markets’  perspective,  strong  restrictions  regarding  the  amount  and  maturity  of  the 
credits would essentially re-establish the budgetary limitations of the weak currency 
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country and therefore drastically reduce the credibility of the exchange rate defense in 
case of a currency crisis. This would inevitably lead to speculation and an eventually 
necessary exchange rate adjustment corresponding to the market pressure. However, a 
guarantee of unlimited mutual credit facilities between participating countries might 
also appear implausible from the markets’ point of view, due to the  expansionary 
liquidity effects that the creditor central bank would have to face as a result from 
credit-financed interventions of the debtor central bank.
91 If the expansionary effects 
on  the  monetary  base  of  the  strong  currency  country  caused  by  the  interventions 
exceed  its  sterilization  potential,  an  unlimited  credit  facility  may  become 
unsustainable from a monetary policy standpoint (especially if the strong currency 
country  is  committed  to  maintaining  price  level  stability).
92  This  would  lead  the 
markets to assume an eventual “opting-out” of the strong currency country from the 
intervention mechanism and thus create credibility problems for the fixed rate system 
as a whole. Altogether, credit facilities should be designed to provide credibility for 
the intervention promise (of the weak currency country) at the lower intervention point 
while also being sustainable for the strong currency country from a monetary policy 
perspective. 
·  The agreed upon interest rate, as well as the denomination of the assets used for the 
repayment obligation, also play an important role when defining the design elements 
of the credit facilities, since they determine the cost of the granted credits for the weak 
currency  country  and  the  allocation  of  the  exchange  rate  risk  connected  with  the 
credit. 
Overall favourable credit conditions, like long settlement periods and low interest rates, allow 
the weak currency  country to not having to immediately  adjust its domestic policy  when 
accumulating liabilities towards creditor countries, since it has ampler scope to replenish its 
foreign exchange reserves, which are needed for repayment, through other sources before the 
credits  mature.
93  Problems  may  arise  from  the  fact  that  advantageously-designed  credit 
facilities could be used as an additional financing element regarding the balance of payments. 
Countries  demanding  intervention  financing  over  a  long  period  of  time  could  use  it  as  a 
facility to permanently finance fundamental balance of payments deficits. The facility would 
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essentially  assist  countries  pursuing  non-stabilizing  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  Credit 
facilities with favourable conditions (long maturity, high amounts, low interest rates, etc.) 
should therefore be designed in a “conditional” manner, e.g. longer maturities are granted 
only  when  the  debtor  country  commits  to  economic  policy  measures  that  re-establish  the 
requisites for market-financed balance of payments. 
Another important aspect is that although the possibility of being granted intervention credits 
does  not  necessarily  alter  the  actual  level  of  a  country’s  foreign  exchange  reserves  it 
obviously reduces the “minimum reserve level” (i.e. the level of foreign exchange reserves a 
weak currency central bank does not intend to fall below due to intervention obligations, since 
doing  so  would  lead  to  either  an  unavoidable  exchange  rate  realignment  or  a  complete 
quitting of the fixed rate system) due to the implicitly larger intervention potential. Moreover, 
through  an  institutionalized  credit  mechanism  a  weak  currency  country  would  not  be 
compelled to hold a large number of different member currencies in its foreign exchange 
reserve as means of intervention, since the required strong currency would be provided by the 
strong currency country itself in case of mandatory intervention.
94 
3.3.2.2  Asset Settlement Rules 
While the credit facility applies to interventions on the lower margin of the fluctuation band 
by  the  weak  currency  central  bank,  the  asset  settlement  rules  establish  the  guidelines  for 
mandatory  interventions  on  the  upper  margin  carried  out  by  the  strong  currency  country. 
When the strong currency reaches it upper intervention point, the strong currency country is 
obliged  to  intervene  in  order  to  support  the  weak  currency  by  purchasing  weak  currency 
assets and supplying its own strong currency to the foreign exchange market. As a result, the 
domestic monetary base and the foreign exchange reserves (in weak currency assets) of the 
strong currency country increase by the size of the intervention volume.
95 The asset settlement 
rules of a fixed rate system stipulate a claim for the strong currency country towards the weak 
currency country, in which the strong currency country can transfer the weak currency assets, 
that it has acquired through obligatory intervention at the upper intervention point, to the 
weak currency country in exchange for strong currency or other assets the weak currency 
country cannot create itself. Since the weak currency central bank has to redeem the weak 
currency reserves that the strong currency central bank has accumulated through mandatory 
interventions, the asset settlement facility essentially stipulates an obligation for the weak 
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currency  country to finance the strong currency country’s interventions.
96 Thus, the weak 
currency  central  bank  faces  a  budget  constraint  to  fulfill  the  asset  settlement  obligations, 
which  is  very  similar  to  the  constraint  it  encounters  when  having  to  finance  its  own 
interventions, because the assets it requires to meet said obligations are limited by its foreign 
exchange reserves. 
Altogether, in a fixed rate system with asset settlement obligation, the weak currency country 
can be forced to carry the burden of financing all interventions (and be subject to the resulting 
reserve  effects),  regardless  of  which  central  bank  is  obliged  to  intervene  because  of  the 
stipulated intervention rules. As much as the established credit facilities provide a loosening 
of the budget constraint for intervention financing, the asset settlement obligations lead to its 
further tightening. 
Similar to the credit facilities, the design elements of the asset settlement rules that have to be 
defined  are  the  amount,  the  maturity  and  the  denomination  of  the  compulsory  settlement 
transactions: 
·  Both the amount and the maturity of the asset settlement obligation determine the 
degree to which the budget constraint for the weak currency country is tightened. It 
has to be established whether the settlement obligations of the weak currency country 
(or at least the amount/maturity thereof) are independent of or conditioned by specific 
reasons  or  circumstances  regarding  the  upper  margin  interventions  by  the  strong 
currency central bank.
97 
·  The  agreed  upon  denomination  of  the  settlement  transactions  is  another  important 
aspect  when  designing  the  asset  settlement  rules.  Not  only  does  it  determine  the 
allocation  of  the  exchange  rate  risk,  but  it  also  establishes  what  assets  the  weak 
currency country can use to fulfill its settlement obligations.  If the weak currency 
country  is  allowed  to  use  additional  reserve  assets  (beyond  the  reserves  held  in 
currency issued by the country intervening at the upper margin) to meet its settlement 
commitment,  it  would  provide  a  relief  of  the  budget  constraint,  since  the  weak 
currency  country  could  use  the  entirety  of  its  reserves  (including  gold  and  other 
reserve currencies).
98 
                                                 
96 In a fixed rate system with asset settlement facilities, the credit repayment obligation and the asset exchange 
obligations from the settlement process are similar from an accounting point of view. See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 20 
97 See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 20. 
98 See Bofinger, 1991, p. 133. 28 
 
3.3.3  Reserve Rules 
Whenever reserve assets denominated in a currency participating in the fixed rate system are 
purchased, held, invested or generally used for intervention purposes, these transactions can 
generate liquidity and other monetary policy effects for the member country that issues that 
reserve currency.
99 Therefore, an institutionalized fixed rate system should establish certain 
reserve  rules,  which  stipulate  in  what  form  central  banks  participating  in  the  system  are 
allowed to use  and acquire their intervention reserves denominated in  member currencies 
(“reserve  investment  rules”)  and  to  which  amount  those  currencies  are  permitted  to  be 
accumulated (“reserve limitation rules”)
100: 
·  When  a  central  bank  intervenes  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  by  either  selling 
(intervention at lower margin) or purchasing (intervention at upper margin) reserve 
assets, it can cause liquidity effects for the intervention currency involved, depending 
on the form of reserve investment. In case of a lower margin intervention, selling 
currency reserves that were previously deposited at the strong currency central bank 
(which issues the intervention currency), will lead to an expansionary effect of the 
intervention  currency  money  base.  In  comparison,  if  the  weak  currency  country 
intervenes by using strong currency reserve assets from market investments (e.g. funds 
deposited at commercial banks), then the intervention will not have liquidity effects on 
the strong currency, since the money circulation will remain unchanged.
101 Regarding 
interventions  at  the  upper  margin,  the  monetary  base  effects  for  the  intervention 
currency (in this case the weak currency) also vary depending on how the acquired 
weak currency reserve assets are invested by the strong currency central bank. If the 
purchased intervention assets are directly deposited at the weak currency central bank 
(i.e. the central bank issuing the intervention currency), then the monetary base of the 
weak currency country is reduced. Alternatively, investing the acquired intervention 
assets in the private market has no liquidity effects, since the weak currency monetary 
base  is  not  affected  by  this  transaction.
102  Due  to  the  described  varying  liquidity 
effects of intervention asset investment, it may be recommendable to stipulate rules 
regarding reserve investment within a fixed rate system. 
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·  As noted in the description of the credit facility, the amount of reserves denominated 
in intervention currencies an individual central bank in the fixed rate system has at its 
disposal,  is  a  decisive  factor  in  determining  the  remaining  monetary  degree  of 
freedom. This is due to the fact that by drawing on its intervention reserves a member 
country can at least temporarily elude the monetary adjustment constraints established 
by the rules of the system or at the least gain time in order to implement adequate 
adjustment policies.
103 An individual central bank has an ample scope to acquire (and 
subsequently  invest)  currency  reserves  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  by  simply 
exercising their issuing monopoly through a domestic money supply based on foreign 
exchange  purchases.  This  practice  might  only  be  limited  by  the  effects  of  the 
manipulated  exchange  rates  or  by  the  instrumental  and  institutional  boundaries  of 
domestic  money  supply  policy.  In  order  to  restrict  the  wide  capacity  of  member 
central  banks  to  accumulate  reserve  currency  (and  thus,  controlling  the 
aforementioned  liquidity  effects  for  the  country  issuing  the  reserve  currency)  a 
specific  agreement  on  reserve  limitation  rules  for  the  fixed  rate  system  might  be 
necessary. 
3.3.4  Central Rate Adjustment Mechanism 
As noted in section 3.3.1.2, defining the central parities is one of the most important elements 
when creating the institutional framework for a fixed rate system. Since the system is based 
on defending these pre-established parities, it appears necessary for the participating countries 
to agree on a mechanism that stipulates the periodicity and criteria for revision and possibly 
realignment  of  the  central  rates.
104  While  it  is  clear  that  the  possibility  of  central  rate 
adjustment should be given in order to reflect divergence in real macroeconomic conditions 
and therefore prevent a systemic defence of a misaligned parity
105, this can also become an 
eventual “exit-strategy” that loosens the system’s adjustment constraints and allows member 
countries to evade the means of coercion resulting from market pressure or unsound policy. 
Thus, the institutional design and functioning of the central rate adjustment mechanism is a 
main determinant of the fixed rate system’s inherent economic adjustment pressure as well as 
                                                 
103 See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 21. 
104 This is one of the main differences between the fixed rate systems discussed in this paper and the final 
integration stage of a monetary union, where the central parities between member countries are irrevocably 
fixed.  
105 Changes in real macroeconomic conditions for example include permanent changes in the terms of trade, 
continuing differences between countries regarding productivity as well as inter-country shifts in savings and 
investment propensities. See Frenkel/Goldstein, 1986, p. 42. 30 
 
the  level  of  its  credibility  from  the  perspective  of  the  markets.  This  is  because  frequent 
revisions of the central parities would reduce the credibility of the commitment to exchange 
rate  stability  and  thereby  also  reduce  the  system’s  value  as  an  anchor  for  expectations. 
Determining the frequency of central parity adjustment can essentially be seen as a choice 
between credibility (of the exchange rate promise) and flexibility (to avoid misaligned central 
rates through adjustment).
106 Regarding the flexibility to avoid misalignments it is clear that 
this  can  also  be  provided  through  policy  adjustment,  since  a  change  in  real  economic 
conditions can be reconciled either by a change in macroeconomic policy with an unchanged 
central  rate  or  by  a  change  in  the  rate  with  unchanged  policies.
107  Because  of  this  the 
flexibility of macroeconomic policy instruments is an important factor governing the choice 
of realignment frequency, since inflexible policies would call for more frequent revisions of 
central rates, and vice-versa. 
The  basic  decision  regarding  the  design  of  the  adjustment  mechanism  is  whether  the 
realignments  of  central  parities  should  be  made  in  a  rule-determined  or  discretionary 
fashion:
108 
·  Rule-determined  adjustments  to  the  central  parities,  as  the  name  implies,  follow  a 
specific  rule  or  formula  that  is  adopted  by  the  system’s  member  countries.  The 
adjustment automatism of the ex ante agreed upon rules for the adjustment mechanism 
can  either  also  be  determined  from  the  outset  (i.e.  the  course  and  extent  of  the 
exchange rate development is established in advanced) or follow a certain formula 
over the course of time (i.e. the binding formula establishes a “contingent contract” 
under which parity adjustments are to be carried out ex post).
109 Possible alternatives 
of rule-determined adjustment mechanisms of central rates that can be found in the 
literature regarding exchange rate systems are for instance “crawling bands” (which 
are characterized by a rule that determines parity adjustments according to inflation 
differentials between participating countries and are proposed by Williamson, 1996; 
and in the BBC-variant in Williamson, 2000), or exchange rate target paths that are 
based on an “uncovered interest parity” formula and thus interest rate differentials (as 
described by Bofinger, 2000a; and Bofinger, 2009). An advantage of rule-determined 
                                                 
106 Relevant to this trade-off is also the pre-established width of the fluctuation band around the central parity, 
since narrow margins drastically reduce the scope of flexibility before an adjustment due to misalignment might 
be necessary. See Cukierman et al., 2004, p. 381.  
107 See Frenkel/Goldstein, 1986, p. 42-43. 
108 See Bofinger, 1991, p. 179. 
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automatic adjustments compared to discretionary realignments is the fact that they can 
considerably  add  to  the  credibility  of  the  exchange  rate  promise  and  the  overall 
stability  of  the  system  if  the  economic  rationality  of  the  adjustment  formula  is 
accepted by the markets. In contrast, a discretionary adjustment mechanism is more 
susceptible to speculative attacks if impending realignments are large and expected by 
the  markets,  therefore  allowing  one-way  bets.
110  Another  advantage  of  a  rule-
determined  adjustment  mechanism  could  be  that  through  automatic  rule-induced 
realignment it can overcome political obstacles that stem from the fact that political 
authorities might be poorly informed or unwilling to perform needed adjustments if 
given discretionary scope of action.
111 But it is also clear that the advantages of rule-
determined  realignments  depend  heavily  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  agreed  upon 
formula to identify the need for adjustment (i.e. being able to take into account all 
relevant  factors).  Assuming  that  this  is  not  the  case  and  ex  post  discretionary 
corrective adjustments are ruled out, then countries might find themselves defending 
misaligned central rates, especially if the relevant parameters not taken into account 
can be manipulated by individual member country policy. It can be assumed that a 
simple  ex  ante  rule  that  can  effectively  anticipate  all  types  of  macroeconomic 
disturbances  relevant  to  ex  post  equilibrium  rates  is  difficult  to  determine. 
Furthermore,  if  the  parameters  that  are  encompassed  in  the  formula  can  be 
manipulated  unilaterally  by  individual  member  countries,  this  could  lead  to 
opportunistic behaviour (e.g. a country might pursue an inflationary policy because 
the automatic realignment rule weakens the constraints of the fixed rate system) and 
endanger the stability of the system as a whole.
112 
·  The alternative to the ex ante established rule-determined adjustment mechanism of 
central  rates  is  to  follow  a  discretionary  case  by  case  ex  post  strategy  regarding 
realignments. The discretionary adjustments to the central parities can be carried out 
within  an  ex  ante  agreed  upon  procedural  framework  for  ex  post  realignments 
(“governance  structure”)  or  without  a  commitment  to  a  specific  procedural 
regulations.
113 If no procedural rules for the discretionary realignments are established, 
then  either  each  country  participating  in  the  system  can  autonomously  adjust  its 
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central rate as it sees fit or an agreement between all involved member states has to be 
reached without a formal ex post procedural framework, which would most certainly 
lead  to  long  and  costly  negotiations.
114  Within  a  “governance  structure”,  the 
discretionary decisions of member states regarding central parity adjustments follow 
ex ante determined procedural rules and competencies that allow avoiding or at least 
reducing the costs and conflicts that may result from complex ex post negotiations. 
Institutional design choices for the procedural framework can be made regarding the 
decision-making competencies (i.e. whether the member countries’ governments or 
central  banks  have  the  final  competency  regarding  the  decision  of  central  rate 
adjustment) and the organisation of the discussion and decision process within the 
“governance structure”.
115 An international organisation could be created to serve as 
forum for informal communication between member states and as a platform for the 
formal common discussion and decision process; this international organisation could 
be bestowed with a mediator role in case conflicts arise in the decision process or even 
be  conceived  as  an  international  decision-making  entity.
116  If  the  decision-making 
authority is to remain with the member states, then an important element of the ex ante 
agreed  upon  procedural  framework  is  the  “decision  rule”  that  is  used  for  the 
discretionary  ex  post  parity  adjustments,  which  can  be  established  as  a  “rule  of 
consensus” (i.e. unanimity between member states is needed for a parity realignment), 
a  “majority  rule”  (i.e.  more  than  half  of  participating  parties  must  agree)  or  a 
“individual initiative rule” in which a single member can unilaterally demand a parity 
adjustment.
117 Generally a majority  rule would provide the widest protection from 
opportunistic behaviour because it prevents unilaterally forced adjustments (in case of 
an individual initiative rule) as well as unilateral veto chances (in case of a consensus 
rule). Such a rule would therefore effectively counter the above mentioned risks of 
unilateral  political  unwillingness  to  realignment  in  a  discretionary  central  rate 
adjustment mechanism.
118 The protection from opportunistic behaviour can even be 
increased if the majority rule is also combined with ex ante established “exception-
rules” that protect single countries from forced realignments that may be induced due 
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to the majority of member countries pursing a destabilizing monetary policy.
119 Next 
to  opportunism,  the  major  risk  of  a  discretionary  approach  to  the  realignment 
procedure lies in the danger of speculative attacks, due to the “one-way bet” problem. 
Although the general problem of speculative capital movements cannot be entirely 
eliminated  in  a  fixed  rate  system  with  a  parity  adjustment  mechanism,  it  can 
effectively  be  reduced  through  an  adequately  established  width  of  the  fluctuation 
bands that satisfies the criterion of “overlapping bands” in case of parity adjustments, 
as described in section 3.3.1.3. 
3.3.5  Short Typology of Different Configuration Alternatives 
The preceding sections have detailed the design alternatives regarding the basic institutional 
features of fixed rate systems. The different combinations of these alternatives define various 
particular types of  fixed rate systems. Bofinger  (1991) differentiates seven basic types of 
systems  that  are  characterized  by  different  traits  concerning  stability  and  symmetry. 
Symmetry  refers  to  the  distribution  of  adjustment  constraints  caused  by  the  reserve  and 
liquidity  effects  in  the  system,  while  the  stability  criterion  in  this  context  describes  the 
system’s inherent capability to limit opportunistic behaviour (i.e. the possibility of member 
states  to  individually  pursue  destabilizing  inflationary  or  deflationary  policies  within  the 
system) through its adjustment constraints. The seven basic types of systems proposed by 
Bofinger encompass three forms of systems with a parity grid standard, as well as two using a 
currency basket standard and two using a key currency standard. In this section these basic 
types will be described briefly in order to present possible configuration alternatives as well 
as to illustrate the effects on stability and symmetry of different design elements working 
together
120: 
·  The “inflationary parity grid standard” is a system that is characterized by intervention 
obligations at the upper intervention point exclusively. Moreover, the  participating 
weak currency countries are not obliged to fulfill any asset settlement commitments 
within this type of system. As a result, member countries that pursue an inflationary 
monetary policy (leading to devaluation pressure on their currency) experience only 
limited  adjustment  constraints,  since  the  exchange  rate  shocks  and  subsequent 
interventions  of  the  strong  currency  country  have  no  effects  on  their  budgetary 
constraint  of  limited  reserves.  The  weak  currency  country  might  be  affected  by 
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restrictive liquidity effects, if the strong currency country intervenes by purchasing 
assets deposited at the weak currency central bank. Obviously, both the weak and the 
strong  currency  countries  can  sterilize  the  eventual  liquidity  effects  of  the  upper 
margin intervention on their monetary bases. In an inflationary parity grid standard the 
distribution of adjustment impulses is therefore essentially determined by the liquidity 
effects and the countries’ sterilization potentials. Assuming that an expansion of the 
domestic  monetary  base  for  the  weak  currency  country,  in  order  to  counter  the 
restrictive liquidity effects, is less problematic than creating an additional demand for 
monetary  base  necessary  to  sterilize  the  liquidity  effects  for  the  strong  currency 
country,  then  the  country  pursuing  an  inflationary  monetary  policy  (i.e.  the  weak 
currency country) would prevail in a “sterilization duel” regarding the distribution of 
liquidity  effects.
121  Altogether,  a  system  designed  as  an  inflationary  parity  grid 
standard can be seen as problematic regarding internal stability (i.e. price stability) and 
symmetry, because it could favour inflationary policy by member states at the expense 
of  the  stability  oriented  states.  Merely  under  the  assumption  that  the  danger  of  a 
deflationary  policy  (or  an  overambitious  stability  policy  following  a  price  shock) 
exceeds that of an inflationary policy within the system, could the inflationary parity 
grid standard provide a stabilizing effect. 
·  The  rules  of  an  “anti-inflationary  parity  grid  standard”  establish  intervention 
obligations only at the lower band margin and do not provide any credit facilities for 
the weak currency country’s interventions. Thus, the weak currency country capability 
to finance its lower margin interventions is limited to its foreign exchange reserves 
and eventual credits from the private financial markets. The functioning of an anti-
inflationary  parity  grid  standard  is  essentiality  the  diametric  opposite  to  the 
inflationary  parity  grid  standard,  since  the  distribution  of  adjustment  constraints 
resulting from the restrictive reserve and liquidity effects of mandatory interventions 
primarily burden the weak currency country. Although the strong currency country 
may  be  subject  to  an  expansionary  liquidity  effect,  if  the  weak  currency  country 
intervenes by selling reserve assets previously invested in the strong currency’s central 
bank, it can be assumed that the strong currency country has an advantage regarding 
                                                 
121 Another problem for the intervening strong currency central bank would rise from the fact that excessive 
growth of its foreign exchange reserves due to mandatory intervention would eventually meet domestic political 
opposition. 35 
 
the capability to sterilize liquidity effects.
122 Due to the asymmetric adjustment burden 
on countries with weak currencies, a system based on an anti-inflationary parity grid 
standard can, to a large extent, provide protection against de-stabilizing inflationary 
policies  by  individual  member  states  within  the  system.  Problems  for  this  type  of 
system could emerge from the fact that it allows for a wider scope of deflationary 
policy  (or  overambitious  stabilisation  after  shocks)  by  individual  member  central 
banks. 
·  A  third  alternative  is  the  “compromise  parity  grid  standard”,  which  combines 
intervention obligations at both the upper and lower fluctuation margin, as well as 
stipulates  credit  facilities  and  asset  settlement  obligations.  Through  the  credit 
facilities, member countries obligated to intervene at the lower intervention point are 
granted  an  unlimited  amount  of  strong  currency  intervention  assets.
123  The  credits 
have fixed maturities and must be repaid, just like the settlement payments resulting 
from the strong currency country’s intervention, in assets the weak currency cannot 
create  itself.  The  distribution  of  reserve  effects  resulting  from  a  de-stabilizing 
(inflationary or deflationary) monetary policy of a member country in a compromise 
parity grid standard is very similar to the distribution in an anti-inflationary parity grid 
standard,  asymmetrically  burdening  the  weak  currency  countries.
124  The  main 
difference is, that by being granted a credit facility, the weak currency’s budgetary 
constraint  of  limited  reserves  is  at  least  temporarily  loosened.  Depending  on  how 
favourable the credit facility conditions (amount, maturity and interest rate) are, the 
weak  currency  country  can  avoid  immediate  adjustments  regarding  its  inflationary 
policy,  which  might  in  turn  lead  to  similar  liquidity  effects  as  described  for  the 
inflationary parity grid standard. Another difference to the anti-inflationary parity grid 
standard  is  that  in  a  compromise  parity  grid  standard,  the  expansionary  liquidity 
effects for the strong currency country will be wider, because both the upper margin 
                                                 
122 The assumption is that the potential of the strong currency country to sterilize liquidity effects, which is 
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similar as in regard to the effectiveness of foreign market interventions in general, there is mixed literature on the 
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123 Since the strong currency country is also obliged to intervene in the foreign currency market and can do this 
essentially without limitation, it makes sense that the credit facility for the weak currency country is established 
as unlimited, at least in the short run.  
124 The reason for this asymmetry can be found in the stipulation of asset settlement obligations, which basically 
force the weak currency country to pay for the strong currency country’s upper margin interventions. See section 
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intervention  obligations  as  well  as  the  credit  facility  financed  lower  margin 
interventions affect its monetary base. In sum, whether the adjustment pressures of a 
compromise  parity  grid  standard  have  a  larger  resemblance  to  those  of  an  anti-
inflationary  parity  grid  standard  or  those  of  an  inflationary  parity  grid  standard  is 
ultimately determined by the design of the conditions for the credit facility and asset 
settlement obligations. A prominent example of this type of fixed rate system is the 
EMS, which will be analysed in detail in chapter 4 of this paper. 
·  The  fourth  system  discussed  by  Bofinger  (1991)  is  the  so-called  “extreme  key 
currency standard”, which is characterized by intervention obligations for the non-key 
currency countries at both their upper and lower fluctuation margin towards the key 
currency.  This  “extreme”  type  of  system  does  not  stipulate  any  asset  settlement 
obligations for the key currency country or any credit facilities for non-key currency 
countries, which leads to a very asymmetrical distribution of adjustment pressures. For 
the  non-key  currency,  the  adjustment  pressure  effects  of  an  extreme  key  currency 
standard are comparable to those of an anti-inflationary parity grid standard when it 
reaches its lower margin and to those of an inflationary parity grid standard when it 
fluctuates to its upper margin. The key currency country on the other hand is not 
obliged to intervene at any moment and its national monetary policy is not subject to 
any  direct  adjustment  constraints,  since  both  an  inflationary  or  deflationary  policy 
have no effects on the key currency country’s limited foreign exchange reserves. The 
system as a whole provides a strong protection from possible de-stabilizing policies of 
non-key currency member states on the one hand, but also allows for wide policy 
discretion for the key  currency  state on the other. This  asymmetry might even be 
enhanced under the assumption that the key currency role is only awarded to countries 
that  possess  vast  political  and  economic  relevance
125,  since  a  reflection  of  this 
economic superiority would most likely be a large capacity for sterilization, that could 
allow the key currency country to counter any liquidity effects on its monetary base 
resulting from interventions by the non-key currency country. Altogether, the extreme 
key currency standard supplies a wide protection against inflationary or deflationary 
policy by any of the non-key currency countries participating in the system, but is 
vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by the key currency country. If the key currency 
country  can  be  expected  to  pursue  a  stability  oriented  monetary  policy,  then  the 
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extreme key currency standard system can provide stability to a degree neither of the 
parity  grid based systems are able to. Due to its institutional features, the Bretton 
Woods  System  (after  the  suspension  of  the  gold  convertibility)  had  a  certain 
resemblance to an extreme key currency standard, with the USD as the key currency. 
·  The “moderate key currency standard” has identical intervention rules as the extreme 
key currency standard (i.e. upper and lower margin intervention obligations), but also 
establishes a credit facility for the non-key currency countries, as well as an asset 
settlement  obligation  for  the  key  currency  country.  Due  to  these  stipulations,  the 
dominance of the key currency country in this type of system is drastically reduced, 
since  it  has  to  essentially  finance  upper  margin  interventions  of  non-key  currency 
countries through the settlement mechanism and also grant them credit facilities for 
lower margin interventions. As a result, reserve and liquidity effects, and therefore 
also  the  adjustment  constraints  on  the  participating  countries,  of  a  moderate  key 
currency standard are the same as those in a compromise parity grid standard.
126 
·  Another possible type of system is the so-called “extreme currency basket standard”, 
which establishes intervention obligations for participating countries at both the upper 
and  lower  fluctuation  band  margins  vis-à-vis  a  currency  basket.  The  institutional 
framework  of  an  extreme  currency  basket  standard  does  not  establish  any  credit 
facilities  or  asset  settlement  obligations,  and  therefore  asymmetrically  burdens  the 
countries  whose  currencies  deviate  the  most  from  the  average  of  all  member 
currencies  (defined  by  the  basket  composition)  with  the  stabilizing  adjustment 
obligations.
127 For a country whose currency is deviating from the basket average, the 
resulting adjustment constraints are very similar to those a non-key currency country 
faces in an extreme key currency standard. Thus, an extreme currency basket standard 
can be a viable option to prevent opportunistic inflationary or deflationary policy by 
member  states,  especially  if  the  risk  of  such  de-stabilizing  policies  being  pursued 
stems from large countries participating in the system.
128 
·  A  less  asymmetrical  version  of  a  currency  basket  based  system  is  the  “moderate 
currency basket standard” which is characterized by identical intervention rules as the 
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127 See section 3.3.1.1. 
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extreme basket version, but also stipulates institutional features like credit facilities 
and an asset settlement mechanism that favour the countries obliged to intervene. The 
macroeconomic  adjustment  constraints  of  a  moderate  currency  basket  standard  are 
very  similar  to  those  in  a  compromise  parity  grid  standard  for  countries  whose 
currency reaches an intervention point. Operational differences result from the fact 
that in compromise parity grid standard both the weak and strong currency countries 
have to intervene simultaneously when their currencies reach their margins vis-à-vis 
each other , while in a basket based system only the country whose currency deviates 
most from the basket average is obliged to intervene. Another difference stems from 
the distribution of asset settlement obligations, because in a moderate currency basket 
standard all member countries have to fulfill settlement obligations towards a strong 
currency country that intervenes at its currency’s upper fluctuation margin.
129 Thus, 
the adjustment constraints resulting from the settlement rules do not burden only one 
weak  currency  country  (as  is  the  case  in  the  parity  grid  system  with  settlement 
obligations), but are distributed among all non-intervening countries of the system. 
Altogether,  in  what  degree  the  effects  on  stability  and  symmetry  of  a  moderate 
currency basket standard differ from those of the extreme version depends mainly on 
how restrictive the conditions for the credit and settlement mechanisms are. Obviously 
for all types of currency basket systems it is only possible to achieve overall stability 
(i.e. price stability) for the system’s currency area, if the majority of the participating 
countries pursue a stability oriented monetary policy. This is because otherwise the 
countries  whose  currencies  deviate  the  most  from  the  average  and  that  are 
subsequently  forced  to  intervene  and  asymmetrically  adjust  are  the  ones  actually 
practicing stability oriented policy. 
3.4  Size of Member Countries 
In addition to the institutionally established rules and framework of the fixed rate system, 
another aspect that is a relevant determinant of the overall adjustment constraints distribution 
of the system is the relative size of the participating countries. Within the system the relative 
size of a member country is essentially defined by its capacity for monetary sterilization and 
the amount of freely available intervention asset reserves it holds:
130 
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·  As noted earlier, interventions at the upper fluctuation band margin have expansionary 
liquidity effects for the intervening strong currency country, because it has to support 
the  weak  currency  by  supplying  its  own  currency  to  the  market.  The  country’s 
capacity to sterilize the impact of these interventions on its domestic liquidity situation 
is determined by the size of its national monetary base (i.e. the credits to the domestic 
banking system), as well as the capability of the country’s monetary authorities to 
control it.
131 The larger the overall size and controllability of  a member  country’s 
national  monetary  base  is,  the  wider  is  its  potential  to  sterilize  the  expansionary 
liquidity effects of foreign market intervention at the upper margin and therefore its 
ability to elude policy adjustment pressure resulting from these effects .
132 On the 
other  hand,  the  weak  currency  country’s  ability  to  sterilize  its  lower  margin 
interventions (i.e. counter the restrictive liquidity effects resulting from purchasing its 
own currency against strong currency assets from its foreign exchange reserves) is 
technically unlimited by simply pursuing an expansionary monetary policy. But the 
expansionary impulses necessary to sterilize the interventions may lead to a further 
weakening of its currency, therefore requiring additional lower margin interventions 
and continued reserve losses.
133 As result, the capacity for intervention for a weak 
currency country is determined by the size of its reserves. The size of a country might 
also  matter  under  the  assumption  that  a  “large”  country  as  opposed  to  a  “small” 
country  can  affect  international  interest  rates  with  its  monetary  policy  (i.e.  its 
sterilization  policy),  therefore  reducing  the  cost  of  sterilization  since  the  resulting 
capital flows might tend to be smaller.
134 
·  The second relevant aspect regarding the size of a country in the system is the amount 
of  intervention  reserves  the  country  holds,  since  this  does  not  only  establish  the 
sterilization  capacity  of  lower  margin  interventions,  as  detailed  above,  but  also 
impacts the overall distribution of adjustment pressures. As described in section 3.3.3, 
if  a  currency  reaches  its  lower  intervention  point,  the  country  issuing  the  weak 
currency can temporarily avoid policy adjustment pressures of the system by drawing 
on  its  foreign  exchange  reserves  to  finance  interventions.  Thus,  the  size  of  its 
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intervention reserves establishes the amount to which a country can accommodate the 
draining reserve effects of lower margin interventions. If the weak currency country’s 
intervention reserves are depleted due to compulsory interventions, further pressure on 
the weak currency will lead to a tightening of the adjustment constraints for the weak 
currency country or eventually to central parity realignment in order to accommodate 
for the speculative market pressure. 
Altogether,  the  size  of  a  country  participating  in  the  fixed  rate  system,  as  defined  by  its 
sterilization capacity and extent of foreign exchange reserves, has an important impact on the 
overall adjustment constraint distribution of the system, since a bigger country in terms of the 
two aforementioned characteristics, has a larger capacity to at least temporarily avoid the 
adjustment  pressure  of  the  system’s  liquidity  and  reserve  effects.  The  symmetry 
characteristics  regarding  the  adjustment  constraints  that  are  established  by  the  system’s 
“rules” can therefore potentially be offset by the relative size of the countries involved in the 
system. 
3.5  Overall Adjustment Constraints of the Fixed Exchange Rate System 
The  institutional  framework  of  the  fixed  rate  system,  constituted  by  the  individual 
institutional  rules  and  features  which  are  described  throughout  section  3.3.,  formally 
establishes the direction and intensity of the liquidity and reserve effects within the system 
that result from mandatory interventions; and therefore plays an integral part in determining 
the overall economic adjustment constraints of the system. The “size” of the participating 
countries is the other main determinant of the system’s inherent symmetry  characteristics 
regarding  the  distribution  of  liquidity  and  reserve  effects,  because  the  formal  (i.e.  rule-
determined) symmetry established by the institutional framework can be (over-)compensated 
by a country’s ability to deflect the liquidity and reserve effects’ adjustment pressure through 
its sterilization capacity and the size of its reserves (see section 3.4.). The set of rules and the 
relative size of the countries participating in the system can therefore be described as the 
structural  determinants  of  the  fixed  rate  system’s  internal  functioning.
135  Together  they 
determine the symmetry characteristics of the liquidity and reserve effects that are effective in 
the system and which in turn trigger and decide the overall allocation of economic adjustment 
constraints  among  the  system’s  strong  and  weak  currency  countries.  However,  the 
identification of a member country’s currency as “strong” or “weak” is not determined by the 
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institutional  framework  of  the  fixed  rate  system,  but  rather  by  the  markets  and  the 
fundamental  economic  conditions.  Regardless  of  the  underlying  degree  of  fundamental 
rationality,  the  pressure  of  the  foreign  exchange  and  capital  markets  can  determine  if  a 
currency is subject to revaluation (then becoming a strong currency within the system) or 
devaluation (leading to a weak currency status). Then, through the market’s revaluation or 
devaluation  pressure,  the  institutionalized  intervention  mechanism  and  with  it  the 
systemically determined liquidity and reserve effects are activated and unfold. Even if the 
system  is  provided  with  mechanisms  for  a  direct  coordination  of  monetary  and 
macroeconomic policies between member states, it still remains dependent on the market’s 
“judgement”, because speculative attacks can only be avoided if the system can effectively 
stabilize market expectations and remain credible.
136 Thus, the overall monetary adjustment 
constraints  of  a  fixed  rate  system  are  determined  by  the  interaction  of  the  institutional 
structure of the system with the relative size of the participating countries and the conditions 
of the capital and  foreign exchange markets.  Figure 2 summarizes the inherent economic 
mechanics  of  a  institutionalized  fixed  rate  system  (i.e.  the  “rules  of  the  game”)  that  are 
described  by  the  aforementioned  interaction  between  the  structural  determinants  of  the 
system’s internal functioning (i.e. the institutional rules and the size of the country) and the 
market transactions that influence them, resulting in the system’s distribution of economic 
adjustment constraints for the participating countries. 
 
4  The European Monetary System 
4.1  Overview 
After chapter 3 provided a detailed institutional analysis of fixed rate systems in general, this 
chapter will focus on the examination of a specific regional exchange rate system, namely the 
EMS, in order to asses its overall efficiency and its success in providing an intermediated step 
towards monetary union. An in-depth analysis of the historic, political and economic rationale 
behind  the  EMS  as  well  as  its  overall  design  and  functioning  will  be  necessary  to  draw 
lessons from the EMS experience that might prove crucial for the Latin American prospects 
of introducing a similar system. In line with this premise, section 4.2 will provide a historic 
background to the introduction of the system, followed by section 4.3 that will detail the main 
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political and economic reasons that led to the EMS. Section 4.4 will describe the institutional 
design of the EMS, while section 4.5 will detail its overall performance. The chapter will 
close with an assessment of the EMS as an effective regional exchange rate arrangement in 
section 4.6. 
4.2  Short Historic Background to the European Monetary System 
This section presents a selective overview of some of the most relevant events in the history 
and evolution of the monetary integration process in Europe leading up to the introduction of 
the  European  Monetary  System  in  March  1979  in  order  to  show  the  difficulties  and 
compromises needed before the EMS fixed rate system could effectively be set up in the 
region.
137  Monetary  policy  coordination  within  the  larger  project  of  economic  and  politic 
integration in Europe dates back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created the European 
Economic Community (EEC; the name was later abbreviated to European Communities (EC) 
after the merger of the Euratom, the European Coal and Steel Community Council and the 
EEC Council of Ministers in 1967) and established a customs union as well as a common 
market  for  cereals,  which  was  later  extended  to  all  agricultural  products  (Common 
Agricultural Policy- CAP), for the participant member states.
138 The Treaty of Rome laid 
down a set of principles for macroeconomic policy conduct (Articles 103 to 108)
139 that called 
for short-term macro policies to be subject of mutual consultation; furthermore it raised the 
possibility  of  assistance  for  balance  of  payments  disequilibria  between  members  and 
encouraged coordination to achieve high employment and price stability in the Community. 
Article 105 established a permanent advisory body, the Monetary Committee, to serve as an 
institutional  forum  for  discussion  and  exchange  of  information  concerning  monetary 
coordination.
140 But although short-term macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate were to 
be  considered  a  matter  of  common  interest  within  the  EEC,  national  monetary  policy 
remained in the hands of the respective governments and was not subject to any binding 
constraints.  Due  to  the  relative  stability  provided  by  the  Bretton  Woods  System  and  the 
domain of the IMF in matters of exchange rate policy and balance of payments assistance, the 
provisions laid down in the Treaty of Rome did not play a de facto relevant role in European 
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139 See Giavazzi/Giovannini, 1989, p. 8. 
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monetary policy at the time.
141 The Bretton Wood agreement (1944) had established a system 
of fixed exchange rates that linked all participant currencies to the US dollar (USD) and the 
USD to the price of gold, in order to provide exchange rate stability
 on a global scale.
142 The 
rules of the system were enforced by the IMF and restricted the fluctuations to a one percent 
band around the central parities against the USD, which meant that two European currencies 
could fluctuate by as much as 4 percent vis-à-vis each other if they changed their relative 
position against the USD to the margins of the band. European countries considered this 
margin too wide and agreed to limit the band to ± 0.75 percent against the UDS, allowing for 
a maximum of 3 percent fluctuation for intra-European exchange rates.
143 
Over the course of the 1960s the development of the common market, especially regarding 
agricultural products, increased the interest in exchange rate stability between community 
members. At the Hague Summit in 1969, shortly after a devaluation of the French franc and a 
revaluation of the German D-mark threatened the durability of the customs union and CAP, 
the EEC Heads of the State agreed to move forward along the road to a full Economic and 
Monetary  Union  (EMU).  However,  there  was  not  a  consensus  on  a  general  strategy  to 
implement the transition to monetary unification and two different integration approaches 
were advocated. France, Belgium and Luxembourg subscribed to so-called “monetarist view” 
(or “corner-stone theory”), which argued for an immediate fixation of exchange rates that 
would in turn force states towards policy convergence. Germany and the Netherlands favored 
the “economist view” (or “coronation theory”) that member states should first achieve a high 
level  of  convergence,  through  policy  coordination  and  supranational  decision  making,  to 
finally – in the last phase of integration – fix the exchange rates irrevocably.
144 In order to 
find a middle ground between these two schools of thought
145, a mayor study by a group of 
high-ranking  EEC  and  member  state  officials,  led  by  the  Prime  Minister  of  Luxembourg 
Pierre Werner, was commissioned. The second and definitive version of the study, known as 
                                                 
141 See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 9. 
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currency standard, as described in section 3.3.5, in which the gold convertibility served as the asset settlement 
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other member countries who renounced the convertibility option. For a detailed description of the Bretton Wood 
System from a historic and institutional perspective, see McKinnon, 1993, p. 1-44; Bofinger, 1991, p. 297-336. 
143 For further detail see Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 9. 
144 See Tsoukalis, 1977, p. 91-97; Ypersele/Koeune, 1984, p. 41-42. 
145  For  a  more  detailed  summary  of  the  dispute  between  “Economists”  and  “Monetarists”  ,  as  well  as  the 
proposals which best encompass their respective views, the Schiller Plan and the Second Barre Plan, see Coffey, 
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the  Werner  Report  and  published  in  October  1970,  was  able  to  achieve  a  compromise 
acceptable to all parties by emphasizing the need of a parallel progress in monetary and non-
monetary policy convergence. It stressed the main objective of full EMU and presented a 
three stage plan to achieve this goal in the span of ten years (1971-1980).
146 The first stage, 
starting  on  1.1.1971,  envisioned  a  number  of  measures  to  increase  coordination  and 
consultation  in  medium  and  short-term  economic  policy,  budgetary  policy  and  monetary 
policy, as well as a reduction in the margins of exchange rate fluctuation between currencies 
of member states. The aim of the second stage, which was not thoroughly specified, was to 
further deepen the achieved integration level and again reduce the fluctuation-bands until the 
final  stage,  to  complete  economic  and  monetary  unification,  would  be  reached  by  1980. 
Monetary Union was to consist of “the total and irreversible convertibility of currencies, the 
elimination of fluctuation in exchange rates, the irrevocable fixing of parity rates and the 
complete liberation of movements of capital” (Werner et al., 1970). 
On March 22, 1971, the Council of Ministers of Economics and Finance (ECOFIN) endorsed 
the Werner Report by adopting a resolution that called for the attainment of EMU in stages, 
with the first stage to be completed by the end of 1973. Despite this political support, the 
Werner  Plan  was  never  fully  implemented  due  to  the  turbulences  in  the  global  monetary 
system during the early 1970s, which happened exactly as the first stages of the Werner Plan 
were supposed to be carried out.
147 Following the major USD crisis of 1971 and subsequent 
suspension  of  the  USD  convertibility  to  gold
148,  the  Smithsonian  Agreement  (December 
1971) intended to fight the immanent collapse of the Bretton Woods System by not only 
devaluating the USD vis-à-vis the price of gold, but also widening the exchange rate band 
around  the  key  currency  from  two  percent  to  4.5  percent.  The  new  margins  implied  an 
increase in the maximum possible excursion of bilateral intra-European exchange rates to nine 
percent, which the EC considered to be excessive and not compatible with the developing of 
the common market.
149As a result, the EC countries decided to restrict the margin of bilateral 
exchange rates to ±2.25 in the Basle Agreement (April 10, 1972), effectively halving the 
exchange rate band established by the Smithsonian Agreement. This initiative was know as 
“the  snake  in  the  (dollar)  tunnel”  (Gros/Thygesen,  1998,  p.15)  and  participation  was 
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expanded to non-EC countries
150, as the UK, with Ireland as part of the UK currency area, 
Denmark and Norway joined the system shortly after it was created.
 151 Only one year later, 
with the definitive collapse of the Bretton Woods System in March 1973, the “snake” became 
a  joint  float  as  European  central  banks  stopped  defending  the  peg  vis-à-vis  the  USD, 
essentially eliminating the “tunnel”. But this “floating snake” proofed to be just as difficult to 
sustain, with several currencies leaving and in some cases rejoining, as well as a large number 
of exchange rate realignments necessary.
152 By 1979 the “snake” had become more of a de 
facto DM-zone instead of any real EC currency stabilization arrangement, with the DM being 
the only major currency in the system, “surrounded by three EEC “satellites” – the Benelux 
currencies and the  Danish kroner – and two non-EEC currencies, the  Norwegian  and the 
Swedish kroner” (Giavazzi/Giovannini, 1990, p.26). The reason for the relative failure of the 
“snake”, especially regarding the ability to keep major currencies together, can be seen in the 
lack  of  formal  rules  for  joint  interventions  and  negotiated  realignments,  which  led  to  an 
overall strong asymmetry in the exchange rate mechanism and denied the system credibility 
without the backing of a global exchange rate system like Bretton Woods.
153 
Despite strong macroeconomic disturbances like the oil crisis in 1973 and the rather unstable 
course  of  the  “snake”,  there  were  several  initiatives  intended  to  further  deepen  monetary 
integration  during  the  1970s.  Examples  are  the  creation  of  the  European  Monetary 
Cooperation  Fund  (EMCF)  in  April  1973,  assigned  to  monitor  and  administer  the  intra-
European exchange rate system, and the EC Council adopting a European unit of account 
(EUA)  based  on  a  composite  basket  of  EC  currencies  as  a  measuring  unit  within  the 
Community in March 1975. A number of approaches to strengthen cooperation in exchange 
rate policy were discussed: the Fourcade Plan of 1974, the Tindeman Report of 1975, the 
Duisenberg Plan of 1976 and the Commission initiative of 1977, led by Roy Jenkins.
154These 
early proposals all supported further monetary integration and the goal of a full EMU, and 
were therefore instrumental in not only creating a favourable environment for the Schmidt-
Giscard  initiative,  which  became  the  EMS,  but  also  ultimately  shaping  the  system.  The 
German-French  proposal  for  a  new  European  exchange  rate  system,  a  conjoint  effort  by 
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German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was first 
presented at the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in April, 1978 and three 
months later (July, 1978), in the meeting held in Bremen, the Council agreed to launch the 
EMS, a monetary system based on a European Currency Unit (ECU) with an Exchange Rate 
Mechanism  (ERM),  much  like  the  “snake”.
155  The  details  for  the  system  were  formally 
decided in the Brussels meeting in December, 1978 and on March 13, 1979 the European 
Monetary System officially came into force. 
Initially,  the  EMS  counted  eight  participating  countries.  These  were  Belgium,  Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The other two EC 
countries, the United Kingdom and Greece
156, were also officially members, but strictly on a 
formal  basis,  since  they  did  not  participate  in  the  ERM.  Despite  a  relatively  high 
heterogeneity  between  the  participants  regarding  population,  per  capita  income,  rate  of 
employment, openness and inflation, they all had a similar interest in deepening integration 
and creating stability for the EC area.
157 These particular motives behind the EMS scheme are 
further detailed in the next section. 
4.3  Reasons for the European Monetary System 
Before a detailed analysis of the specific rules and mechanics of the EMS is given, it is 
important to illustrate the motivations and pursued goals behind the Schmidt-Giscard EMS-
initiative and the decision of the EC states to adopt it as the next step in European monetary 
integration,  especially  since  these  actions  were  accompanied  by  much  public,  as  well  as 
academic debate and criticism.
158 Analysing these motivations will also allow for a better 
assessment of the performance and results of the system as a whole. The reasons that led to 
the EMS can be divided into political and economic motives, although these often overlap. 
The political reasons will mainly be described by the political interests on a national level that 
originated the EMS proposal by France and Germany, while the analysis of the economic 
reasons will deal with the general macroeconomic objectives, such as exchange rate stability 
and inflation convergence, which prompted the European countries to adopt the ERM of the 
EMS. 
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4.3.1  Political Reasons 
The  origin  of  the  EMS,  the  Schmidt-Giscard  initiative  in  1978,  was  mostly  a  product  of 
political, rather than of economic considerations by its initiators Germany and France.
159 The 
German Chancellor Schmidt and the French President Giscard d’Estaing both enjoyed wide 
domestic  support  at  the  time,  which  gave  them  the  political  strength  to  pursue  more 
ambitious, long-term actions on the national as well as the European level. In the French 
elections in 1978 Giscard d’Estaing cemented his position in the government, allowing him to 
follow up on the long-term plan to stabilize the French economy, specifically by re-joining an 
exchange rate system with Germany.
160 The German government also counted with strong 
national acceptance, not least because of the way it had handled the terrorist threat of the 
“Rote Armee Fraktion” (RAF), and the results of the French election reassured Germany that 
France would aim for a policy of stabilization, therefore facilitating a joined initiative. 
Another political reason was the growing interest of both countries to lessen the dependence 
on the United States and the USD, prompting them to seek a stronger and wider alliance 
within the EC.
161 While independence had been a traditionally relevant matter for France, it 
was particularly important to Germany because of the persistent weakening of the USD. The 
German government feared that the growing loss of confidence in the American currency, 
partly due to an active US-policy to “talk the dollar down” (Gros/ Thygesen, 1998, p.37), 
would lead to large shifts in demand towards the DM. The resulting strong appreciation of the 
DM vis-à-vis the USD and the other European currencies, that were not part of the “snake”-
system,  would  in  turn  have  negative  effects  on  the  international  competitiveness  of  the 
German industry, reducing profits and employment. To counter this development, Schmidt 
decided to push for closer monetary integration in Europe (an initiative that would become the 
EMS)  by  linking  as  many  willing,  free  floating  EC  currencies  to  the  DM  as  possible. 
Spreading the pressure from the weakening USD over a wider monetary area would stabilize 
Germany’s  trading  environment,  protect  Germany  against  being  in  the  forefront  of  the 
critique by international organizations regarding economic policy and increase the influence 
of Europe in the global economy.
162 This strategy also appealed to France and the other EC 
countries, since it appeared to guarantee a better cohesion within Europe as well as a joint 
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response to the pressure exercised by the US and international organizations. Closer monetary 
cooperation would serve as an instrument for pushing forward political integration, since it 
was expected that by joining the EMS, countries would tighten their commitment and create a 
favorable starting point for the transition to full EMU.
163 
Finally, a third political motivation that led Germany and France to pursue further European 
integration, was the growing concern regarding the political developments in Italy at the time. 
The growing influence of the Italian Socialist Party as well as the impending political alliance 
of the Christian Democrats with the Communist Party (compromesso storico) were seen as 
threats  in  the  geopolitical  order  of  the  Cold  War  by  Italy’s  West  European  community 
partners.
164 The Schmidt-Giscard initiative was to provide an option for a clear incorporation 
of Italy into a stable European framework
165 and secure Italian participation in the long term 
goal of European integration. 
4.3.2  Economic Reasons 
Apart from the specific long-term goal of European integration, the reason that prompted the 
EC member states to embrace the Schmidt-Giscard initiative and launch the EMS was the 
desire to establish a “zone of monetary stability in Europe”.
166 
The  stability  objective  encompassed  both  an  external  (i.e.  stable  exchange  rates  among 
participating countries) as well as an internal (i.e. inflation reduction/convergence through a 
policy of disinflation) dimension.
167 
4.3.2.1  Interest in External Stability 
The interest of the EC member states in joining the ERM of the EMS, which was similar to 
the motive that led to the creation of the “snake”, stemmed from a general aversion to intra-
Community exchange rate instability, both in its short-term (“volatility”) and its medium-term 
(“misalignments”) form.
168 
Short-term volatility of intra-EC exchange rates would have strong negative effects due to the 
degree of “openness” of the EC countries.
169 While the “openness” (measured as the imports 
as a share of GDP in Table 1) of the EC as whole was relatively low (10.4% in 1960, 12.3% 
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in 1987) and comparable with the numbers for the USA and Japan at the time, the individual 
EC countries were a lot more open. Because of the regulations set by the Treaty of Rome, 
which called for the reduction (and eventual elimination) of taxes and other trade barriers 
between member states in order to establish “free movement of goods” and the “common 
market”, as well as the relatively low transportation costs due to the regional proximity of 
most  EC  countries,  intra-EC  trade  had  grown  significantly.  Table  2  shows  that  for  every 
member state, except Denmark, trade within the EC (as a share of total trade) had grown since 
1958 (the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957) and that by 1970 over half of the Community’s 
trade was intraregional. Because of this high degree of trade integration, volatile exchange 
rates were seen as very problematic. 
This is because, for a highly integrated area like the EC, that had very few trade restrictions 
and low transportation costs, the “law of one price” would be rather stable.
170 Consequently, 
frequent short-term exchange rate fluctuations and the subsequent short-term deviations from 
the “law of one price” can cause arbitrage transactions with negative effects on local suppliers 
or on exporting firms if these are forced to frequently adjust their local prizes to counter the 
arbitrage effects, resulting in high “menu costs” and very erratic local pricing policies.
171 So 
because of the “openness” of a “common market” area (like the EC and now the EU) firms 
have a lot more difficulties to apply the commonly used strategy of “pricing-to-the-market” to 
cover for exchange rate volatility. 
Another reason for the aversion of the EC countries to short-term exchange rate instability 
was that apart from causing problems for the “common market” in general, it posed a serious 
threat to the European agricultural sector in particular, specifically the “Common Agricultural 
Policy”,  which  was  institutionalized  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome.
172  Under  the  CAP,  the  EC 
agricultural  market  was  organized  through  a  common  price  policy  which  set  EC-wide 
intervention  prices  for  agricultural  goods  in  a  common  currency  unit,  which  was  then 
translated in local currencies at the ongoing exchange rate. 
173 So essentially, the “law of one 
price” was dictated by law in the CAP and was also especially rigid, because the intervention 
prices for many products were established on an annual basis. Because of the rigid prices, 
short-term exchange rate volatility could lead to strong and arbitrary shifts in profitability for 
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producers in the agricultural sector across Europe, as well as induce swings in agricultural 
trade in the EC region. In order to deal with these difficulties, the CAP had to introduce a 
complicated system of so-called “green exchange rates” and compensating payments.
174 
Exchange rate stability was not only a desired goal in the short-term, but also in the medium-
term. Being that the EC was a highly integrated area, exchange rate misalignments, defined as 
significant  deviations  of  the  mid-term  (i.e.  actual)  real  exchange  rate  from  its  long-run 
equilibrium level
175, could cause significant problems, since shifts in real exchange rates are 
identical with shifts in competitiveness. Because changes in real exchange rates can be seen as 
equal  to  relative  changes  in  domestic  costs,  the  effects  on  competitiveness  can  only  be 
neutralized through adjustments in domestic price and wage levels.
176 For countries with an 
appreciating currency, these types of adjustments are difficult because they would demand an 
absolute decrease of nominal wages, which tend to be rigid in the downward direction. This 
relation between appreciation and competitiveness explains the German involvement in the 
creation of the EMS, since the DM was subjected to strong appreciation pressure at the time, 
as mentioned in section 3.2.1. But real exchange rate stability was also of interest for the EC 
as a whole, in order to prevent against “beggar-thy-neighbour” strategies that countries could 
use  to  unilaterally  improve  their  competitiveness  by  depreciating  their  currency.  This 
argument  was  of  special  importance,  since  many  viewed  the  competitive  exchange  rate 
depreciations of the 1920s and 30s as the reason for the disruption of international trade, 
massive unemployment and protectionism that contributed to the ensuing rise of fascism in 
Europe.
177  After  the  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods  System  and  the  unsatisfactory 
performance of the “snake”, the ERM of the EMS was intended to be a new scheme that 
provided stability and in case of major exchange rate changes, at least subject these to a 
common decision process. 
4.3.2.2  Interest in Internal Stability 
In addition to external stability (stable exchange rates), the EMS was also intended to provide 
internal  stability  for  the  EC  area  by  advancing  the  convergence  in  macroeconomic 
performance  across  Europe.  This  intention  was  manly  directed  at  the  reduction  and 
convergence of inflation rates, since over the course of the 1970s big differences between EC 
                                                 
174 For a more detailed description of the “green parities” and the “Monetary Compensatory Amounts”, see 
Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p.11; Giavazzi/Giovannini, 1989, p.14-18. 
175 See Williamson, 1985, p. 13-17. 
176 See Bofinger, 2000b, p.5. 
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member  states  regarding  inflation  had  developed,  causing  serious  problems  for  many 
European countries.
178  In  1979, the  year the EMS came into force, the inflation rates for 
“snake” countries like Germany and the BENELUX-states were around 4 percent while EC 
countries with free floating exchange rates like France (10.8 percent), Ireland (13.3 percent) 
and Italy (14.8 percent) had relatively high inflation rates.
179 In joining the EMS, the high-
inflation countries hoped to fight inflationary effects by pegging their currencies to the low-
inflation  countries  and  reducing  the  cost  of  disinflation  policy  by  importing  credibility, 
specifically from the German Bundesbank, which enjoyed an excellent reputation regarding 
monetary  policy  and  fighting  inflation.
180  Credibility  is  very  important  for  a  policy  of 
disinflation because in countries with a weak anti-inflationary reputation, the public would 
expect the  government to deviate from the  announced inflation aim by engineering some 
surprise inflation to increase output and employment (“time inconsistency problem”). The 
public would adjust its expectations and anticipate this, so inflation would therefore be higher, 
but without positive effects on output and employment.
181 Thus, countries with little inflation-
fighting credibility were “caught in a trap of high inflationary expectations” (Gros/Thygesen, 
1998,  p.143),  which  they  were  forced  to  ratify  in  order  to  avoid  a  strong  increase  in 
unemployment that would occur if they reduced inflation below the level expected by the 
public. In this context, the EMS could theoretically work as a “disciplinary device” for high-
inflation countries, that would provide a credible framework (by pegging the exchange rate to 
the stable DM) to stabilize prices and convince the public of an anti-inflationary commitment, 
therefore  reducing  inflation  expectations  and  lowering  the  unemployment  costs  of  a 
disinflation policy. Whether this strategy of “tying one’s hands”
182 and the general approach 
of using the DM as an anchor
183 within the ERM of EMS were successful, is discussed further 
in the following sections regarding the performance of the EMS. 
 
 
                                                 
178 See Bofinger, 2000b, p.3. 
179 See Table 3. 
180 See Bofinger, 2000b, p.3. 
181 For further detail on the “time inconsistency problem” see Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p.143, 180-183. 
182 See Giavazzi/ Pagano, 1988. 
183 Note that within the analysis of this paper an “anchor” currency, in contrast to a “key” currency, is not 
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4.4  The Features and Mechanisms of the European Monetary System 
After having briefly described the historic background as well as the political and economic 
rationale  of  the  European  Monetary  System,  this  section  will  focus  on  detailing  the 
institutional structure of the EMS. The analysis of the individual institutional elements will 
widely follow the general framework regarding the institutional design of fixed rate systems 
described in chapter 3 of this paper. 
4.4.1  The European Currency Unit and the Central Parities 
The creation of a new monetary unit, the European Currency Unit (ECU),
184 was one of the 
first  steps  taken  in  designing  the  EMS.  The  ECU  was  essentially  a  currency  basket  as 
described in section 3.3.1.1, and because it was intended to have a variety of functions in the 
EMS it will briefly be described separate from the actual institutionalized intervention rules 
and financing mechanisms of the system. The ECU was to “be at the centre of the EMS” 
(Resolution  of  the  European  Council  of  5  December  1978  on  the  establishment  of  the 
European Monetary System, Paragraph 2.1, extract printed in Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p.58) and 
fulfill a number of tasks in the system (Paragraph 2.2): 
·  “as a denominator (numéraire) for the exchange rate mechanism; 
·  as the basis for a divergence indicator; 
·  as  the  denominator  for  the  operations  in  both  the  intervention  and  the  credit 
mechanisms; 
·  as a means of settlement between monetary authorities of the European Community.” 
The ECU currency basket was defined by specified amounts of all Community currencies. 
The amount or weight of each component currency in the basket was to reflect the relative 
economic size of the country. The economic criteria that determined the weight of a countries 
currency in the ECU were: the share of the country in the GDP of the Community, its share in 
intra-Community trade and its share in the financial support system of the EMS. Table 4 
shows the composition of the ECU in amounts of national currencies. The ECU was a fixed-
amounts basket, which meant that intra-European exchange rate fluctuations would lead to 
changes in the relative weights of the various currencies as well as the exchange rate of the 
ECU vis-à-vis all currencies.
185 This was particularly a concern regarding currencies like the 
                                                 
184  The  acronym  ECU  was  also  reminiscent  of  a  medieval  coin  used  in  France  and  England,  the  ècu.  See 
Ypersele/Koeune, 1984, p. 49. 
185  For  a  formal  analysis  of  the  effects  of  bilateral  exchange  rate  fluctuations  on  the  ECU  weight,  see 
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British pound (later also the Greek drachma, the Portuguese escudo and the Spanish peseta) 
that were part of the ECU but did not initially participate in the ERM of the EMS. Since 
exchange rate fluctuations could move the relative weights in the ECU far away from the 
initial representative composition, the unit amounts of each currency in the ECU basket was 
to be reviewed after the first six months of the EMS and after that periodically every five 
years, or also on request, if the weight of any participant currency changed by 25 percent or 
more.
186 In order to serve as a means of settlements, the participating central banks were 
given an initial supply of ECUs against the deposit of 20 percent of their gold and dollar 
reserves with the EMCF (on a revolving basis).
187 In practice, the actual role of the ECU (in 
contrast with its “official” role) in the intervention mechanism of the EMS was relatively 
limited (as will be shown in the following sections). Nevertheless, it has to be noted that 
during the existence of the EMS the ECU was increasingly adopted for private use on the 
international financial markets.
188 
4.4.2  The Intervention Rules and the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
As with any fixed rate system, the intervention rules (i.e. the exchange rate standard, the 
central  parities  and  their  respective  adjustment  mechanisms,  the  band  width  and  the 
intervention obligations) established the core element of the EMS, the so-called Exchange 
Rate  Mechanism  (ERM).  The  central  parities  of  the  system  were  established  by  each 
participant  currency  being  assigned  an  ECU  central  rate,  which  was  agreed  on  by  the 
ECOFIN and the country  in question and defined the price of one ECU in terms of that 
currency.
189 On the basis of the ECU central rates, the EMS established de jure two different 
intervention mechanisms in order to provide exchange rate stability: 
·  The divergence indicator, which established an intervention mechanism that follows 
the basic structure of a currency basket standard based on the ECU 
·  A bilateral intervention mechanism based on a parity grid standard 
Although the initial premise of placing the ECU at “the center of the EMS” would have 
signified that the ERM was to use the ECU as the pivot in the intervention rules, essentially 
reforming the previous exchange rate system (i.e. “the snake-system”) and creating a currency 
                                                 
186 See Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the European Monetary 
System, Paragraph 2.3, extract printed in Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p.59. 
187 See Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the European Monetary 
System, Paragraph 3.8, extract printed in Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p.60. 
188 See Fuchs, 1989.  
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basket  standard  system,  several  member  states  (Denmark,  Germany  and  the  Benelux 
countries) opposed this development by stating that the “snake” was not under discussion and 
would remain completely intact.
190 This strong resistance of most of the “snake” participant 
EC countries to an ECU-centered system (especially Germany
191), as well as the technical 
complications attached to a basket-pegged intervention mechanism
192, led to the retaining of 
the bilateral parity grid standard and obligatory intervention rules very similar to the “snake” 
as  the  basis  for  the  ERM  of  the  EMS.  As  a  compromise  to  the  participant  countries 
advocating an ECU-pivoted currency basket standard system, the parity grid would use the 
ECU  as  a  denominator  (see  section  4.4.1.);  and  a  supplementary  intervention  mechanism 
based on the divergence of the participant currencies from the ECU central rate was created, 
the  divergence  indicator.
193  But  interventions  based  on  the  divergence  indicator  were  not 
stipulated as mandatory, thereby maintaining the fluctuation margins of the bilateral rates in 
the parity grid as the sole trigger of compulsory interventions. As a result, the obligatory 
intervention mechanism based on the parity grid standard was the de facto core of the ERM of 
the EMS.
194 The EMS can therefore be essentially defined as a parity grid standard system.
195 
Any  further  mention  to  the  system’s  ERM  in  the  scope  of  this  paper  will  thus  refer 
exclusively to the intervention rules stipulated for the parity grid intervention mechanism. 
Nevertheless, in order to provide a complete description of the institutional framework of the 
EMS,  the  following  two  sections  will  briefly  describe  both  intervention  mechanisms:  the 
divergence indicator and the more relevant parity grid. 
4.4.2.1  The Divergence Indicator 
The intervention mechanism based on the divergence indicator follows the basic structure of a 
currency basket standard. This mechanism was a main innovation in the EMS compared to 
the “snake”, since it used the ECU as a pivot and did not rely on a bilateral but rather a 
unilateral intervention rule. The indicator (Di) signalled the divergence of each EMS currency 
from its pre-assigned ECU central rate and was defined as: 
                                                 
190 See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p.45. 
191 Because of the upwards tendency of the DM at the time, the German Bundesbank strongly resisted joining a 
ECU-centered system that would single out the divergent currency and force unilateral intervention, since this 
would have compromised national monetary policy. See Giavazzi/Giovannini, 1989, p. 41-42. 
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intervention; and the concerns regarding the different fluctuation scopes in a currency basket standard depending 
on a currency’s weight in the basket, as described in section 3.3.1.1. 
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194 See Bofinger, 2000b, p. 6. 
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Di = ((si – ci)/ci) (1/(1 – wi)) (100/m) , 
where si and ci are the market and central rates for currency i, wi the weight of the currency in 
the ECU basket and m the deviation percentage for the bilateral margins in the parity grid (i.e. 
2.25  percent).
196  In  Paragraph  3.5,  the  European  Council  Resolution  of  1978  defined  the 
“threshold of divergence” as Di = 0.75 for each currency, which meant 75 percent of the 
maximum possible divergence, that would be observed if currency i deviated by the full 2.25 
percent margin from all other EMS currencies.
197 When a currency crossed this threshold, it 
was expected that the concerning country would “correct this situation by adequate measures 
namely: a) diversified intervention, b) measures of domestic monetary policy, c) changes in 
central rates, d) other measures of economic policy” (Paragraph 3.6). If such intervention 
measures were not taken, “on account of special circumstances”, the involved country would 
have to justify this inaction to the other countries, first in the concertation between central 
banks and later possibly in the ECOFIN Council. 
Although the divergence indicator was seen as an important innovation at the time of its 
creation, being the sole example of a specific and multilateral objective indicator as a trigger 
for policy coordination, it did not play a significant role in the intervention policies of the 
EMS.
198 This was due to the rather informal and, as mentioned, non-obligatory nature of the 
policy prescriptions, which merely “presumed” an intervention; but also because in many 
cases the participant countries used intra-marginal interventions well before the divergence 
indicator reached the 75 percent threshold. 
4.4.2.2  The Parity Grid of Exchange Rates 
The parity grid is the core of the ERM of the EMS. As mentioned above, for each currency 
participating in the EMS a central rate in ECU was agreed on. Through the fixed central rates, 
bilateral central rates between any two of the participating currencies were determined and 
linking all of these together formed the parity grid of the system as a whole. Thus, in the 
parity grid the ECU ended serving merely as a numéraire for the relevant bilateral rates. The 
intervention  rules  of  the  ERM  demanded  that  a  participating  currency’s  bilateral  market 
exchange rate vis-à-vis any other EMS currency stayed within a pre-assigned margin, in either 
direction, from the bilateral  central parity.  At the start of the EMS in  1979, the bilateral 
margins were set at 2.25 percent on each side of the central parity, therefore creating a 4.5 
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percent wide fluctuation band. For Italy the margins were set at ± 6 percent, mainly because 
of the high Italian inflation rates compared to the other EMS countries. By allowing the lira to 
fluctuate in a wider band of 12 percent, the Italian central bank was given more space to 
maneuver without having to resort to realignment. 
Obligatory intervention points were established at both the upper and lower margin of the 
fluctuation band. Because the “symmetry of the bilateral parities implied that whenever a 
currency  A  reached  its  upper  intervention  point  vis-à-vis  currency  B  […],  currency  B 
simultaneously reached its lower intervention point vis-à-vis currency A” (Bofinger, 2000b, 
p.6), it follows that any two EMS currencies reaching their bilateral margins against each 
other, would lead to both countries’ central banks being obligated to simultaneously intervene 
in the foreign exchange market. Thus, the parity grid of bilateral exchange rates established a 
formal symmetry regarding the distribution of intervention obligations. To fulfill the marginal 
intervention commitment in the EMS, the issuing central bank of the stronger currency (i.e. 
the  appreciating  currency  that  has  reached  its  upper  intervention  point  vis-à-vis  the 
depreciating  currency)  had  to  purchase  the  weaker  currency  and  the  “relatively  weaker” 
issuing central bank was to sell the stronger currency.
199 The defence of  the intervention 
points through compulsory marginal intervention was stipulated to be unlimited in amount.
200 
While there were technically no limits for the strong central bank to the amount of the weaker 
currency that could be bought by supplying its own currency to the market, the EMS also 
provided an unlimited short-term credit line (the “very short-term facility”) to allow the weak 
central bank to intervene (i.e. buy its own currency by selling the stronger one) limitless 
beyond its reserves. How this credit facility worked will be further detailed in the section 
regarding the financing mechanism of the system. 
Note also, that interventions in the ERM were not only carried out when the outer limits of the 
exchange rate band were reached, but also before (within the intervention points), since the 
EMS agreements allowed central banks to intervene intramarginally by buying and selling 
each other’s as well as non-EMS currencies in the foreign exchange market.
201 The intra-
marginal interventions were carried out at the discretion of the individual central bank and 
used often, since a currency reaching its ERM margin was seen by the markets as a negative 
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200 See Agreement between the Member States of the EEC setting terms of operation for the European Monetary 
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sign. When an intervention was done in a Community currency, it was subject to the consent 
of the central bank whose currency was being sold or bought, whereas interventions in non-
Community  currencies  (e.g.  USD)  did  not  require  mutual  authorization  and  were  always 
allowed.  The  original  EMS  framework  did  not  establish  financing  provisions  for  intra-
marginal intervention.
202 
Since the rules of the parity grid established the relevant intervention mechanism of the EMS, 
it has to be analysed how this intervention mechanism distributed the monetary adjustment 
constraints  among  the  countries  participating  in  the  System.  Due  to  the  symmetrical 
intervention obligations in the parity grid, the preliminary liquidity and reserve effects of 
interventions become effective in both the weak and strong currency countries. The strong 
currency country is subject to an expansionary monetary base effect and increasing reserves, 
whereas  the  weak  currency  country’s  monetary  base  and  reserves  decrease.
203  How  this 
preliminary distribution of effects resulting from the intervention rules, and coupled with the 
possibly altering effects of the other institutional features, determine the overall functioning 
and adjustment constraints of the system, is described in section 4.4.6. 
4.4.3  The Financing Mechanism 
4.4.3.1  The Credit Facilities 
The  institutional  framework  of  the  EMS  established  three  different  types  of  credit 
mechanisms. Before the most important one, the Very-Short-Term Facility (VSTF) created to 
provide credit facilities for the financing of mandatory foreign exchange market interventions, 
is detailed, the other two facilities that were established to aid member countries in balance of 
payments difficulties will be described briefly: 
·  The Short-Term Monetary Support (STMS) was aimed to provide short-term financial 
support for balance of payments problems. In this facility, the EC central banks grant 
each other short-term credits that have a maturity of three months and can be extended 
twice  for  three  months  each.  The  amount  of  the  credit  lines  is  limited  to  exactly 
defined debtor and creditor quotas. 
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·  Medium-Term Financial Assistance (MTFA), which in contrast to the VSFT and the 
STMS  was  not  administered  by  the  central  banks  but  by  the  EEC  Council  of 
Ministers, granted member countries medium-term (maturity of two to five years) aid 
for  balance  of  payments  difficulties.  These  credits  however  were  conditioned  to 
economic adjustment policies in order to re-establish a market financed balance of 
payments equilibrium.
204 
Since both the STMS an the MTFA did not play a relevant role for the ERM of the EMS, 
further analysis of the credit facilities of the system will exclusively focus on the intervention 
credits provided by the VSTF. 
The VSTF consisted of mutual credit lines among the central banks participating in the EMS. 
The credit lines were unlimited
205 and automatic, and were meant to provide an unrestricted 
amount  of  financial  assistance  to  central  banks,  in  order  to  fulfill  eventual  compulsory 
intervention commitments. Because central banks only had limited reserves of each other’s 
currencies, it was crucial that they could draw on the partner central bank issuing the currency 
necessary  for  intervention  if  their  currencies  had  reached  the  bilateral  margins.  Thus,  the 
unlimited nature of the facility was intended to provide credibility to the bilateral parities of 
the EMS by securing the financing of marginal interventions.
206 All transactions of the VSTF 
were denominated in ECU and recorded on the accounts of the central banks with the EMCF. 
The settlements for the VSTF credit lines were to be made at least 45 days after the end of the 
month in which the intervention had taken place.
207 At the request of the debtor central bank 
the credit lines could be automatically renewed for a period of three months and with the 
consent of the creditor central bank a second extension of three months was also possible. But 
beyond  the  first  deadline  of  45  days,  financing  of  marginal  interventions  was  no  longer 
unlimited,  since  the  extended  credit  lines  were  limited  to  a  ceiling  equal  to  the  debtor 
country’s quota in the STMS facility. The interests of the VSTF credits were established by a 
weighted average of representative interest rates of the ECU-basket currencies. Repayments 
of the VSTF credits could be denominated in the creditor’s currency, in “official” ECU, or in 
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other reserve assets that could not be created by the debtor country (i.e. the debtor country’s 
own currency).
208 
The credit mechanism of the VSTF provided an unlimited short-term access to intervention 
assets  for  the  weak  currency  countries,  but  due  to  the  short  maturity  of  the  credits  the 
unlimited intervention promise was only credible for a limited period of time. Afterwards, the 
strict  budget  constraint  of  limited  available  reserves,  which  were  needed  to  finance  the 
interventions, was re-established by the credit repayment obligations.
209 
4.4.3.2  Settlement Rules 
The  settlement  rules  of  the  EMS  established  that  interventions  carried  out  by  a  strong 
currency  country  at  its  upper  intervention  point  were  essentially  accounted  like  an 
intervention  of  a  weak  currency  country  at  its  lower  intervention  point  drawing  on  its 
intervention credit facility (VSTF).
210 The weak currency assets accumulated by the strong 
currency central bank, when it was forced to intervene at the upper margin, were routinely 
transferred to the EMCF. In the central banks’ VSTF accounts with the EMCF, the transferred 
weak  currency  assets  then  established  corresponding  ECU-assets  for  the  strong  currency 
central  bank  and  ECU-liabilities  for  the  weak  currency  central  bank.  The  settlement 
obligations  of  these  resulting  balances  for  the  weak  currency  country  followed  the  same 
mechanics as the repayments of the credit lines drawn on the VSTF. Thus, interventions at 
both the upper and lower margin created an increasing VSTF indebtedness and had to be 
financed by the weak currency countries.
211 This arrangement was mainly based on article 6.2 
of the Agreement between the Member States of the EEC setting terms of operation for the 
European  Monetary  System  (Basle,  1979):  “The  financing  operations  concluded  in  this 
connection shall take the form of spot sales and purchases of Community currencies against 
the crediting or debiting of accounts denominated in ECUs with the European Moneatry Co-
operation Fund (…)”. 
The settlement obligations imposed on the weak currency countries through this arrangement 
had  decisive  impact  on  the  overall  symmetry  characteristics  of  the  EMS,  because 
interventions  by  the  strong  currency  country  essentially  established  the  same  adjustment 
constraints for the weak currency country as their own credit-financed interventions. Due to 
                                                 
208 For further detail see the Agreement between the Member States of the EEC setting terms of operation for the 
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the  fact  that  both  upper  and  lower  margin  intervention  had  to  be  financed  by  the  weak 
currency  countries,  their  budget  constraint  of  available  reserve  assets  was  significantly 
tightened. This fact might also explain why weak currency countries in the EMS intervened a 
lot  intramarginally,  since  then  they  could  avoid  the  “double  burden”  of  marginal 
interventions.
212 
4.4.4  Reserve Rules 
As  described  in  section  3.3.3,  a  fixed  rate  system  can  establish  institutionalized  rules 
regarding  the  amount  (reserve  limitation  rules)  and  form  (reserve  investment  rules) 
participating  central  banks  are  allowed  to  hold  reserves  denominated  in  other  member 
countries’ currencies in order to control the liquidity effects of reserve accumulation. The 
reserve rules established by the institutional framework of the EMS were rather loose and 
therefore not specifically quantifiable. Regarding the “reserve limitation rules”, article 15 of 
the Agreement between the Member States of the EEC setting terms of operation for the 
European Monetary System (Basle, 1979) established the central banks’ upper limits for the 
holding of intervention reserves in member currencies: “The central banks may hold working 
balances  in  Community  currencies  within  the  limits  laid  down  by  the  Committee  of  the 
Governors.  These  limits  may  be  exceeded  only  with  the  consent  of  the  central  bank 
concerned.”  While  a  rigid  limitation  of  the  holding  of  intervention  reserves  to  “working 
balances” would have meant a significant tightening of the budget constraint for lower margin 
interventions (since the budget is precisely defined by the limited reserve assets available for 
intervention or credit repayment), in practice the procedure was not handled as strictly as 
stipulated.
213 Nevertheless, the reserve limitation rule stipulated by article 15 restricted the 
accumulation of reserve assets denominated in member currencies and also made it subject to 
the consent of the central bank issuing the currency in question. 
The institutional framework of the EMS did not stipulate reserve investment rules for its 
participating  countries.  The  central  banks  of  the  EMS  were  therefore  free,  regarding  the 
decision on how they preferred to hold their intervention reserves; they could either directly 
deposit them at the fellow central bank issuing the concerned currency or invest them in the 
private market. 
In sum, the reserve rules did not play a significant role in the overall functioning of the EMS. 
However,  the  restriction  of  the  accumulation  of  reserve  assets  denominated  in  member 
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currencies to “working balances” and being subjected to consent of the issuing central bank, 
contributed in tightening the budget constraint of intervention reserves of the weak currency 
countries, therefore increasing the need for intervention financing through the credit facility of 
the system in case of lower margin intervention obligations.
214 
4.4.5  Central Rate Adjustment Mechanism 
The final institutional feature of the EMS that has to be analysed is the adjustment mechanism 
of the central rates of the system. The ECU central rates did not follow any pre-established 
adjustment rule, but were fixed and could only be changed when a realignment of the central 
rates was decided. Paragraph 3.2 of the European Council Resolution of 1978 established the 
adjustment  procedure,  but  remained  unspecific  regarding  the  reasons  that  would  lead  to 
realignments: “Adjustments of central rates will be subject to mutual agreement by a common 
procedure which will comprise all countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism and 
the Commission. There will be reciprocal consultation in the Community framework about 
important decisions concerning exchange-rate policy between countries participating and any 
country not participating in the system.” These regulations established a common procedure 
for the central parity adjustment mechanism that established a mutual consent rule for the 
realignment  decision.  Nevertheless,  by  not  providing  any  more  concrete  rules  for  the 
realignments, the EMS allowed a very discretionary approach regarding the adjustment of 
ECU central rates.
215 Since the decision of discretionary central rate realignments was solely 
assigned to the European Council and not the central banks, the exchange rate adjustment 
competency within the EMS was essentially of political nature.
216 Because the realignment 
competency required unanimous mutual consent, therefore ensuring each involved member 
state a political veto, the discretionary central rate adjustments were subject to a politically 
dominated process of negotiation.
217 Finally, it has to be noted that due to the rather limited 
role  the  ECU  de  facto  played  in  the  ERM,  realignments  were  in  practice  negotiated  in 
bilateral member currency rates which would then lead to changes in the ECU central rates.
218 
How  the  discretionary  approach  to  realignments  was  de  facto  used  in  the  EMS  will  be 
discussed in the section regarding the overall performance of the system. 
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4.4.6  Overall Adjustment Constraints in the EMS 
As established in section 3.2, the crucial aspect for the assessment of a fixed rate system 
concerns  the  distribution  of  the  adjustment  constraints  (i.e.  whether  the  weak  currency 
country or the strong currency country (or possibly both) has to bear the adjustment in case of 
shocks forcing foreign market intervention) within the institutional framework of the system. 
The formally symmetrical distribution of intervention obligations in EMS’s exchange rate 
mechanism  (established  by  the  parity  grid  and  described  in  section  4.4.2.2.)  led  several 
authors at that time to assume an overall symmetry of adjustment pressures in the EMS.
219 To 
determine whether or not this was actually the case, the concrete intervention procedures and 
resulting effects have to be analyzed. In order to do this, assume a situation in which the 
French franc came under attack and depreciated vis-à-vis the DM until it reached its lower 
intervention point, at the same time the DM reached its upper intervention point vis-à-vis the 
franc  due  to  the  symmetry  of  the  bilateral  parity  grid.
220  Because  of  the  symmetrical 
intervention obligations both the Bundesbank and the Banque de France (BdF) were obliged 
to intervene in the foreign exchange market. 
The  interventions  of  the  BdF  (i.e.  purchasing  its  own  currency  by  supplying  DM  to  the 
market) led to expansionary liquidity effects for Germany and restrictive effects on its own 
monetary base, as well as a reduction of the French foreign exchange reserves. In order for the 
BdF  to  be  able  to  fulfill  its  intervention  promise  beyond  its  limited  reserves  (that  were 
restricted to “working balances”, see section 4.4.4.), it was granted the unlimited short-term 
credit lines of the VSTF. But because of the relatively tight conditions of the VSTF (short 
maturity, extension limited to small quotas; see section 4.4.3.1.), the ability of the BdF to 
cope with persistent speculative attacks simply by the means of (sterilized) intervention was 
still subject to a strict budget constraint of limited reserves. As a result, in order to staunch the 
outflow of reserves, the Bdf eventually had either the option of raising interest rates and 
pursuing a more restrictive monetary policy or to devalue through central rate adjustment.
221 
The Bundesbank simultaneously fulfilled its intervention obligations by providing its own 
currency to the market and purchasing franc assets. The liquidity effects resulting from the 
Bundesbank’s  foreign  exchange  market  intervention  were  identically  symmetrical  as  the 
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liquidity effects of the BdF interventions (i.e. expansionary effect on the German monetary 
base,  restrictive  effect  on  the  French  monetary  base).  Regarding  the  reserve  effects,  the 
intervention  by  the  Bundesbank  increased  its  foreign  exchange  reserves.  Because  the 
increasing  accumulation  of  reserve  assets  was  not  restricted  by  any  real  limitations,  the 
Bundesbank (in contrast with the draining reserve effects for the BdF) was not subjected to 
any  policy  adjustment  constraint  through  this  channel.
222  Furthermore,  because  of  the 
settlement  rules  of  the  EMS,  interventions  by  the  strong  currency  central  bank  were 
essentially  treated  the  same  as  VSTF  credit  financed  interventions  by  the  weak  currency 
country (see section 4.4.3.2.). The Bundesbank transferred the purchased franc deposits to the 
EMCF and was subsequently credited on its VSTF account, while the BdF VSTF account 
with the EMCF was correspondingly debited. As a result, the Bundesbank interventions had 
the  same  effect  for  the  BdF  as  its  own  interventions,  creating  an  increasing  VSTF 
indebtedness  that  tightened  the  BdF’s  budget  constraint  and  lead  to  policy  adjustment 
pressure (devaluation or interest rate increase) in order to avoid eventual insolvency. 
All in all, the ERM of the EMS established symmetrical preliminary liquidity-effect-based 
adjustment constraints for the participating countries and asymmetrical reserve effects that 
unilaterally burdened the weak currency countries with adjustment pressure (in this example 
France).
223 The liquidity effects are described as preliminary because the involved central 
banks  could  counter  these  effects  by  sterilizing  their  interventions.  The  Bundesbank  was 
always able to fully sterilize the liquidity effects of its interventions and therefore never lost 
the control over the domestic short-term interest rate, which it used as its operating target.
224 
Thus, speculative attacks were never a reason for the Bundesbank to relax its monetary policy 
stance. Because the sterilization capacity of the weak currency central banks of the EMS was 
again  limited  by  their  reserves  (see  section  3.4.),  the  liquidity  effects  resulting  from 
interventions  often  led  to  policy  adjustment  pressures  for  the  weak  currency  countries 
displayed by substantial increases of real short-term interest rates, as shown by Figure 3.
225 As 
a result, the EMS was not only asymmetrical regarding the adjustment constraints resulting 
from  the  reserve  effects,  but  also  in  terms  of  the  liquidity  effect  determined  adjustment 
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constraints due to the asymmetrical sterilization behavior of the member countries.
226 In spite 
of the formal symmetry of the ERM, the overall functioning of the institutional framework of 
the EMS, which intended to stabilize bilateral exchange rates, established a strong asymmetry 
in favor of the strong currency countries. The main beneficiary was the Bundesbank, which 
was through this asymmetry protected from being infected with the relatively high inflation 
rates that abounded in some of the other member states at the beginning of the EMS (see 
Figure 4). While the credit facilities of the EMS could have been designed to counter this 
asymmetry by significantly loosening the budget constraint of the weak currency countries, 
they were in fact conceived in a rather restrictive way in order to only provide unlimited 
credits  in  the  very  short-term  as  means  to  fight  transitory  speculative  attacks,  but  to 
discourage the support of unsustainable exchange rate levels in the medium and long-term. 
The overall asymmetry of adjustment constraints had a decisive impact on the credibility of 
the system as a whole, because the exchange rate promise could only be credible from the 
market’s perspective if the weak currency countries that were asymmetrically burdened with 
the  adjustment  constraints  were  able  (and  willing)  to  perform  said  policy  adjustments 
(changes in monetary policy) in the case of  crisis, or else the need for an exchange  rate 
adjustment in form of a realignment became evident. 
Despite the aforementioned literature, the rather asymmetric nature of the EMS, especially in 
its  initial  years  prior  to  the  Basle-Nyborg  agreement  that  somewhat  relaxed  the  strict 
conditions of the credit facilities, is today generally accepted.
227 
4.5  The Performance of the European Monetary System 
4.5.1  Brief Chronology of the EMS Experience 
This section is intended to give an assessment of the overall development and performance of 
the  EMS  from  a  chronological  and  factual  approach,  while  section  4.5.2  will  detail  the 
“lessons” that can be drawn from the system’s functioning from a more analytical perspective. 
The EMS experience for the participating European countries can essentially be divided in 
four phases, that will be briefly described under the criteria of internal and external stability, 
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as  well  as  whether  or  not  the  system  contributed  in  enhancing  policy  coordination  and 
common decision making in Europe, leading to a deepening of integration.
228 
4.5.1.1  The uneasy initial phase from 1979 to 1983 
The initial four-year phase until March 1983 can be described as rather uneasy due to frequent 
realignments and wide policy divergence between the member states.
229 There were a total of 
seven realignments during this phase, which essentially followed tendencies similar to those 
of the “snake”-system, in which the currencies of Belgium/Luxembourg, Denmark, France, 
Italy and Ireland experienced constant devaluation pressure vis-à-vis the German DM and the 
Dutch guilder.
230 An exception to this trend was the brief bout of downward pressure the DM 
suffered around the turn of the year 1980/1981 that, however, did not result in adjustment 
action.
231 The degree of the exchange rate adjustments was in some cases substantial as Table 
5 (that compiles all realignments during the EMS experience) shows, e.g. in June 1982 the 
DM revaluated 10% towards to French franc. Regarding the objective of internal stability, 
there was no decrease in member state’s inflation rates or inflation rate convergence in the 
initial period of 1979 to 1983 (See Figure 4). This can largely be attributed to the second large 
oil price shock from late 1979 that did not only raise inflation for the region in general, but 
also led to a divergence in national policy, as the EMS countries responded differently to the 
challenges of the shock.
232 Despite the rather modest success regarding stability, the first four 
years of the EMS marked a period of trial and orientation that led to progress in exchange rate 
policy coordination and paved the way for further joint action. Compared to the experience 
under the “snake”-system, the realignment procedure became less unilateral and informal, and 
more visibly a subject of joint decision.
233 The move to common decision-making became 
especially evident in the February 1982 realignment, where Belgium and Denmark accepted 
substantially lower devaluations than they had initially requested (which were comprehensible 
from a competitiveness standpoint) due to strong objections of the other participants. This 
signaled a clear stand against even a presumption of preemptive and competitive devaluations 
and also established the EMS “strong currency” strategy, which “avoided compensating fully 
for  past  losses  in  competitiveness  and  took  a  dynamic,  forward-looking  approach  with 
emphasis on domestic adjustment” (Ungerer, 1997, p.173) that tightened the constraints for 
                                                 
228 This chronological classification follows Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 73-104; Tsoukalis, 1997, p. 146-162. 
229 See Tsoukalis, 1997, p. 147-148. 
230 For a detailed discussion of all the realignments see Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 73-81.  
231 See Ungerer, 1997, p. 173. 
232 See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 73. 
233 See Ungerer, 1997, p. 173. 66 
 
member countries (especially “small” members) and provided a linkage from realignments to 
domestic policy adjustments, therefore making long-term convergence more feasible. 
4.5.1.2  The calmer intermediate consolidation phase from 1983 to 1987 
The second phase, which started in 1983 and ended with the realignment of January 1987, 
was  a  calmer  period  of  consolidation  for  the  EMS.  It  was  characterized  by  a  common 
consensus to follow more stability-oriented policies and long periods without adjustments of 
the  central  rates  (see  Table  5).  There  was  an  increasing  emphasis  on  convergence  in  the 
development of costs, prices and monetary aggregates to underpin exchange rate stability.
234 
The realignments in this period followed mostly internal reasons that were either political, as 
in the case of the April 1986 adjustment which was prompted mainly by a government change 
in France, or stemmed from difficulties due to real appreciation and current account deficit, 
like the July 1985 and August 1986 devaluations to the Italian lira and the Irish pound, both of 
whose emitting countries still had inflation rates well above the rest of the EMS states.
235 But 
the final realignment of the second phase in January 1987 was the first of a new type of 
externally prompted adjustment that was caused more by speculative unrest in the foreign 
exchange and capital markets then by macroeconomic divergence among the member states. 
The rapid fall of the USD in late 1986 had led to an increased demand for DM funds, which 
put upward pressure on the German currency and finally resulted in the necessary general 
adjustment of central rates. Nevertheless, the second phase was, as mentioned, characterized 
by  relative  exchange  rate  stability  that  can  be  widely  attributed  to  a  successful  policy  of 
disinflation (and inflation convergence) during this period, as seen in Figure 4. The anti-
inflationary policies of the Bundesbank had become a reference point for the policies of the 
other member countries and the DM slowly established itself as the anchor currency of the 
system.
236  Furthermore,  intramarginal  interventions  started  to  play  a  bigger  role  as  EMS 
countries  tried  to  avoid  reaching  their  mandatory  intervention  points  in  order  to  counter 
exchange rate pressures even before they could develop a momentum of their own and, thus, 
enhancing  overall  stability  of  the  system.  Mandatory  marginal  interventions  declined 
significantly in comparison to the initial phase of the system. On the other hand, the increased 
use of intramarginal interventions might have had the negative effect of preventing the use of 
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more aggressive and necessary interest rate policy adjustments by the member states.
237 Also, 
the  required  approval  of  the  country  emitting  the  currency  used  in  the  intramarginal 
intervention  could  prove  to  be  unwieldy  in  sudden  changes  of  market  conditions  and  to 
politicize the intervention process, as well as enhance the asymmetry in the system, because 
with the aforementioned reorientation of member countries’ policies to follow Germany, the 
intramarginal  interventions  were  mainly  carried  out  in  DM,  which  was  accepted  by  the 
German government since they were not obliged to provide credit facilities for interventions 
within the fluctuation band.
238 
4.5.1.3  The stabile phase from 1987 to 1992 
The third phase of the EMS (that lasted from 1987 to September 1992) was characterized by 
exchange rate stability, since the system was managed without adjustments to the central rates 
for over 5  years.
239 This stability was especially remarkable considering for instance that 
during this period three additional currencies (ESP, GBP and PTE) joined the system
240; and 
that following the European Common Market project, the signing of the Single European act 
by the EC Council of Ministers in February 1986 called for the gradual removal of capital 
controls by those EMS participants who had retained them.
241 Although average inflation in 
the EMS increased over the third phase, mainly as a result of German unification in 1990, the 
goal  of  inflation  rate  convergence  was  not  negatively  affected  (again,  see  Figure  4). 
Regarding the development of policy coordination, important improvements were made with 
the adoption of the Basle-Nyborg agreement in September 1987 at the beginning of the third 
period.  The  main  reason  for  the  Basle-Nyborg  agreement  can  be  seen  in  the  concerns 
regarding external (capital and foreign exchange market) pressures leading to realignments, as 
experienced in the last adjustment of the second phase mentioned above, which the EMS 
members  thought  could  be  avoided  by  better  policy  coordination  and  if  the  system  had 
provisions that increased its resistance against speculative attacks.
242 Other reasons were the 
aforementioned removal of capital controls leading to increased capital mobility that called 
for  more  coordination  of  national  monetary  policies,  and  also  the  growing  concern, 
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particularly in France and Italy, regarding the asymmetric nature of the system in favor of the 
DM and German policy.
243 The main modifications to the original institutional framework of 
the EMS (described in section 4.4) which resulted from the Basle-Nyborg agreement, were
244: 
·  In order to improve the intervention financing mechanism, it was agreed to extend the 
maturity  of  settlements  arising  from  mandatory  interventions  by  one  month  to 
altogether 3,5 months, since the initially stipulated 2,5 months had at times proven to 
be too short to accommodate necessary adjustments after realignments. In addition, 
the  respective  debtor  quotas  in  the  Short-Term  Monetary  Support,  which  can 
automatically extend part of the accumulated intervention credits for another three 
months, renewable once, were doubled in amount. 
·  Even more significantly, the efficiency of the intervention rules design was enhanced 
by  extending  the  access  of  the  Very-Short-Term  to  the  financing  of  intramarginal 
interventions, as long as the creditor central banks concerned did not explicitly object 
and the drawings did not exceed twice the debtor quota of the intervening country. 
This  measure  was  especially  important  due  to  the  reliance  on  intramarginal 
interventions in the EMS (as mentioned above) that had before been subject to the 
approval of the intervention currency’s issuing central bank, but under the new rules 
established a “presumption” of agreement. 
·  Finally, as another measure to facilitate settlement procedures, it was agreed that the 
acceptance limit of the creditor central bank for the settlements paid by the debtor 
central bank in official ECU would be raised from a maximum of 50 to 100 percent. 
Apart from these institutional reforms, the Basle-Nyborg agreement recommended a better 
balance of the EMS’s operating instruments that were exchange rate mobility within the band, 
changes  in  interest  rate  differentials  and  interventions.  The  concern  was  that  the  use  of 
intervention had been excessive, so for instance, the flexible use of the fluctuation margins to 
deter  speculation  and  avoid  prolonged  bouts  of  intramarginal  interventions  was 
recommended.  Furthermore,  an  intensified  surveillance  of  monetary  developments,  in 
particular  to  highlight  any  policy  inconsistencies  within  the  EMS  and  incompatible 
approaches to third currencies was determined.
245 
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Finally, it is also noteworthy that during this phase of relative stability the debate on the goal 
of  monetary  union  was  restarted  with  the  Delors  Report  in  1988  and  the  signing  of  the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
4.5.1.4  The turbulent phase from 1992 to 1993; Period of Reconsolidation    
Despite the relative stability and convergence achieved over the three previous phases, the 
fourth phase was characterized by crises and a near de facto suspension of the fixed rate 
system.  Before  the  main  reasons  for  the  crises  are  presented,  the  historical  facts  of  the 
turbulent phase as well as the subsequent period of reconsolidation will be briefly detailed. 
Following  a  continued  anti-inflationary  stance  of  high  interest  rates  by  Germany,  in 
September  1992  massive  interventions  had  to  be  carried  out  by  the  Bundesbank  and  the 
Italian central bank to support the lira, which nevertheless briefly left its fluctuation band, 
having come under severe pressure. These large interventions led the German officials to 
assess the possibility of suspending intervention obligations because of the threat to domestic 
price  stability,  and  to  urge  for  an  exchange  rate  adjustment.
246  The  Italian  lira  was 
subsequently devaluated seven percent on September 14
th 1992, but this appeared not to be 
enough from the market’s perspective, as both the lira and the British pound came under 
massive  pressure  in  the  following  days.  On  September  16
th  1992  (the so-called  “Black  –
Wednesday”), the Monetary Committee suspended both the  Italian lira  and British pound 
from further EMS participation after heavy interventions had failed to lift them above their 
agreed lower limits, and also decided a devaluation of the Spanish peseta by five percent.
247 
This was followed by further downward adjustments of the peseta as well as the Portuguese 
escudo and the Irish pound (see Table 5).
248 The following official EC reports assessing the 
1992 crisis – which failed to emphatically state the obligation of defending central rates that 
could not be regarded as misaligned – as well as the continuing strong recession in most of 
Europe,  the  persisting  restrictive  German  monetary  policy  and  a  new  French  government 
committed to aggressively lowering interest rates; all together increased the tensions in the 
EMS beyond control.
249 In July 1993 the French, Belgian and Danish currencies all fell below 
their lower band margins, implying a breach of EMS stipulations. In order to prevent a further 
erosion  of  the  EMS  and  avoid  giving  one-way  bets  to  speculators  through  massive 
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realignments (especially since the central rates were still considered to be appropriate), on 
August 1, 1993 the ECOFIN Council and central bank governors decided to drastically widen 
the fluctuation margins to ±15 percent. This announcement to dramatically extent the bilateral 
exchange rate bands was essentially a suspension of the fixed rate system’s rules since the 
EMS moved close to de facto flexible rates, and also fundamentally questioned the goal of 
monetary unification.
250 Nevertheless, it can be argued that by maintaining the main elements 
of  the  EMS  (particularly  the  well-tested  central  rates,  which  were  preserved  after  the 
widening  of  the  margins),  the  member  states  signaled  that  they  were  willing  to  continue 
pursuing monetary integration. A period of reconsolidation and de facto informal convergence 
in the monetary stance of the remaining members followed. The desire of member countries 
to again stabilize and keep exchange rates within lower limits than ±15 percent was indicated 
by the high volume of intramarginal interventions in 1993 and 1994.
251 A final realignment of 
the peseta and the escudo took place in March 1995. In the fall of 1996, the Italian lira re-
entered the EMS, as did the Finnish markka. The system continued to operate with relative 
stability until the beginning of the European Monetary Union in January 1999. Following 
monetary unification, the ERM II was set up as a successor to the ERM (the institutional 
framework of the ERM II is basically the same as that of the EMS with the ±15 percent 
margins)  that  is  intended  to  provide  stability  between  the  euro  and  other  non-EMU  EU 
currencies as well as serve as an intermediate step towards participation in the euro area.
252 
Turning to the main reasons of the EMS crises, there were several aspects that contributed in 
leading to tensions in the EMS and eventually the 1992/1993 crises, which will be briefly 
described: 
·  One of the main aspects that led to the crisis can be seen in the growing tensions 
within the ERM due to real appreciation.
253 Despite the overall success of the EMS 
countries in fighting inflation, there still might have been insufficient convergence.
254 
Countries  that  had  joined  the  EMS  later,  like  Spain  and  the  UK,  but  also  initial 
members like Italy and Ireland, still had considerable inflation differentials vis-à-vis 
Germany.
255 Thus, all of these countries experienced substantial real appreciations of 
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their currencies that could at least partially be compensated in the initial phases of the 
EMS  through  the  constant  realignments,  but  in  later  periods  (of  constant  nominal 
exchange rates) led to massive losses in international competitiveness and to growing 
current account deficits. This strong overvaluation of some currencies, in the absence 
of realignments (see Figure 6 that shows the real exchange rates of EMS currencies 
vis-à-vis the DM), coupled with the restrictive monetary policy of high interest rates 
pursued by the EMS countries in order to accelerate the disinflation and inflation-
convergence process, caused major tensions within the system. The prime example of 
this is Italy, that after regularly devaluating its currency in nominal terms (vis-à-vis the 
DM) during the initial period of the EMS (see Table 5), changed its exchange rate 
policy after 1987 to target an almost stable nominal exchange rate, while experiencing 
strong real appreciation throughout (Figure 6). At the same time, the Banca d’Italia 
pursued a restrictive monetary policy of high interest rates to fight domestic inflation 
and the continuing real appreciation.
256 The resulting rise of interest differentials vis-à-
vis the DM shortly before the crisis, since DM interest rates were considerably lower 
at the time, would have required a high risk premium (of expected depreciation) on the 
lira in order to establish an equilibrium on the international financial markets.
257 But 
this high risk premium was not given, because the markets now considered the Lira as 
relatively stable due to Italy’s switch to a more stable exchange rate policy and the 
narrowing of the lira’s fluctuation margins (see 4.5.1.3). As a result, the interest rate 
differential led to huge short-term capital inflows that combined with the persisting 
real appreciation became unsustainable for the Italian economy.
258 Political failure to 
agree on a large downward realignment of the lira to counter these effects, led to the 
lira being forced out of the ERM in September 1992.
259 Since other currencies (e.g. 
the peseta and the pound sterling) had similar real appreciation problems as the lira, a 
continued nominal depreciation or correction in form of a “maxi-realignment” that 
devaluated might have been adequate to at least mitigate the effects of the crisis.
260 
·  Another  reason  for  tension  in  the  EMS  during  the  turbulent  crisis  phase  was  the 
insufficient coordination of the national monetary and economic policies within the 
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system.
261 The inflationary effects induced by the expansionary fiscal policy, product 
of the German unification, led the Bundesbank to pursue a more restrictive monetary 
policy of high interest rates.
262 At the same time, the other EMS experienced high 
unemployment and overall stagnating activity, as well as an effective reduction of 
inflation  rates  in  some  cases  (e.g.  France).
263  Following  the  tightness  of  German 
monetary  policy  was  therefore  not  appropriate  for  the  other  EMS  countries,  but 
because of the commitment to stable exchange rates in combination with the central 
role of the DM in the system, the other EMS countries could not lower their interest 
rates below the level set by the Bundesbank. 
264 This dominance of German monetary 
policy  in  the  EMS  will  be  further  detailed  in  section  4.5.2.3.  As  a  result,  the 
incompatibility of the monetary and fiscal policies between the member states led to 
strong tensions within the EMS.
265 “German (and European) interest rates remained 
too high in a period of recession, the domestic opposition to deflationary policies kept 
on growing in several countries, while market operators placed ever larger bets on a 
general  realignment  of  currencies,  thus  questioning  the  sustainability  of  existing 
exchange rates and/or policies.” (Tsoukalis, 1997, p. 156) 
·  In addition to the differences in the economic situation of the EMS countries that put 
pressure on the ERM, there were political uncertainties that provided further fuel for 
speculative attacks. For instance, the narrow “no” in the Danish referendum regarding 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 led to growing doubts in the 
further  development  of  European  monetary  cooperation  (specifically  EMU)  and 
therefore might have motivated speculation against the existing central rates of the 
EMS.
266 Because the second wave of speculative attacks in 1993, after the first crisis 
of 1992 had led to the dropping out of Italy and the UK, targeted currencies (like the 
French franc and the Danish krone) that were underpinned by much stronger economic 
performance and not systematically overvalued, it can be argued that the reasons for 
these  attacks  were  at  least  partially  determined  by  perceptions  of  low  political 
decisiveness in the EMS.
267 
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·  Finally, the expansionary monetary policy of the USA in 1992 created a high interest 
differential in favor of European currencies, that in turn lead to a weakening of the 
USD and an increased demand for the DM. As a result, the DM appreciated vis-à-vis 
the other EMS currencies, creating further disturbances for the system. 
4.5.2  Lessons from the EMS: Achievements and Deficiencies 
4.5.2.1  Internal and External Stability 
As noted in section 4.3.2, the EMS was intended to establish a “zone of monetary stability” in 
both  an  internal  (i.e.  low  inflation  and  inflation  convergence)  and  external  (i.e.  stable 
exchange rates) dimension. 
Regarding the goal of external stability, the ERM contributed immediately upon its inception 
in 1979 to a rather stable development of nominal exchange rates. In order to illustrate this, 
Figure 5 shows that the nominal exchange rate of the DM vis-à-vis other EMS currencies 
followed rather stable and convergent paths. This stabilization is further confirmed by the data 
in  Table  6,  which  indicates  that  the  monthly  variability  of  bilateral  ERM  exchange  rates 
declined directly after the start of the EMS and continued to decline gradually along the first 
three phases until rising again sharply during the turbulent phase of 1992-95. Table 6 also 
shows that the monthly variability of bilateral ERM exchange rates was considerably lower 
than  the  variability  against  non-ERM  EU  currencies  and  against  the  USD.  The  real  DM 
exchange rate paths were very different from the nominal paths they were associated with, as 
Figure 6 shows. While Denmark, France and the Benelux countries kept a relatively stable 
exchange rate against the DM, Ireland and Italy underwent a vast real appreciation until the 
EMS crisis of 1992, as mentioned in section 4.5.1.4. In retrospect it seems clear that in order 
to correct this disequilibrium both Italy and Ireland should have targeted a continuing nominal 
depreciation vis-à-vis the DM instead of a stable nominal path; this correction then happened 
forcefully with the massive nominal depreciations that followed the crisis.
268 Nevertheless, if 
one considers that the real intra-EMS exchange rate variability during this time is comparable 
with the nominal measures and significantly lower than the variability vis-à-vis the USD, it 
can  be  argued  that  the  EMS  contributed  to  both  nominal  and  real  exchange  rate 
stabilization.
269 
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The contribution of the EMS to the aspect of “internal” stability, meaning the reduction of 
inflation, is not as evident. Although not immediately (due to second oil price shock) inflation 
rates in the EMS countries decreased and converged over the course of the EMS experience, 
especially  during  the  1980s,  as  described  in  the  chronological  analysis  and  illustrated  in 
Figure 4. In the academic discussion of the late 1980s this reduction of the inflation rates in 
the EMS area was often pointed at as an evident sign of the system’s success in inducing the 
disinflation process.
270 It proves difficult to effectively asses the real impact of the fixed rate 
system on disinflation since the alternative condition of an “experience without exchange rate 
arrangement”  (Monticelli/Papi,  1996,  p.  21)  can  obviously  not  be  tested  for  the  member 
countries.  To  somewhat  mitigate  this  difficulty,  the  inflation  rate  development  for  EMS 
countries can be compared with that of non-EMS economies sufficiently similar to the EMS 
states, except for the fixed rate system.
271 Figure 7 shows that the inflation rates of both EMS 
and non-EMS countries behaved very similar over the period 1973-1990. It could therefore be 
argued that the exogenous shocks or policy factors at the time, which affected both groups 
similarly, had a bigger impact on inflation rate development than the EMS membership. 
Furthermore,  the  argument  of  importing  credibility  to  achieve  disinflation  (described  in 
section 4.3.2.2.) relied on the idea of a credible commitment to an exchange rate peg vis-à-vis 
the DM, but the allowed fluctuation within the band as well as the frequent realignments 
during the first phases of the EMS (see Table 5) do not indicate that the central parities were 
seen as a fully binding constraint by the participating countries. This is in line with empirical 
studies that analyze the success of the EMS in reducing the costs of disinflation by importing 
credibility, measured by the “sacrifice ratio” (i.e. the reduction in inflation over the increase 
of unemployment for a given period), which conclude that EMS countries did not in general 
pay a lower price for disinflation “bought” by unemployment than other countries.
272 Finally, 
when evaluating the disinflation process in Europe during the EMS experience, it has to be 
considered that there are two possible levers a relatively open country can use to achieve 
disinflation. It can do this via the aggregate demand channel by raising the domestic real 
short-term  interest  rate;  or  alternatively  through  the  real  exchange  rate  via  its  effect  on 
enterprise profitability, since a real appreciation increases domestic costs compared to the 
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costs of foreign competitors and therefore has a dampening influence.
273 As Figure 3 shows, 
there was an overall increase of real short-term interest rates in the EMS countries over the 
course of the disinflation process in the 1980s, especially in those with high inflation rates 
(France, Italy and Ireland; see Figure 4). In this context it has to be noted that France targeted 
a real depreciation to counter the dampening effect of high real interest rates; while Italy and 
Ireland  experienced  strong  real  appreciation  throughout  the  1980s  (Figure  6),  so  that 
disinflation was based on both levers. Thus, it appears that most of the disinflation during the 
EMS experience was achieved through the domestic lever of high real interest rates rather 
than through the system itself.
274 
In sum, it can be said that the EMS was successful in establishing a zone of both external and 
internal monetary stability. In terms of external stability, the ERM of the EMS successfully 
reduced both nominal and real exchange rate variability for the countries participating in the 
system. Regarding the reduced internal monetary instability (inflation), the role of the EMS is 
not as clear. While inflation rates were clearly reduced and also converged after the EMS 
adoption, it cannot be conclusively proved that the system was instrumental in achieving this. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the EMS did not hinder the disinflation process and might 
have also provided a stable framework for a coordinated policy response to outside shocks 
(e.g.  swings  in  the  USD  and  the  price  of  oil),  therefore  facilitating  macroeconomic 
convergence for the region.
275 
4.5.2.2  The Role of Capital Controls in the EMS 
The general view during the late 1980s, which was based on the literature on speculative 
attacks, was that the capital controls imposed by several EMS countries were necessary for 
the survival of a fixed rate system like the EMS and thus expressed concerns regarding the 
liberalization of the capital markets in the early 1990s.
276 This section will therefore discuss 
the general role and effects of capital controls in a fixed rate system and apply them to the 
experience of EMS countries that used them. The prime examples were Italy and France, who 
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had controls on international capital movement before entering the system and tightened these 
during the initial uneasy phase of the EMS.
277 
The general purpose of capital controls in a fixed rate system is to retain the control over the 
domestic interest rate, since without controls and under fixed exchange rates the domestic and 
international interest rates are linked due to the fact that investors demand an equal expected 
return (adjusted by a risk premium) whether they invest in the domestic or the international 
market.
278  Thus,  if  national  authorities  want  to  lower  interest  rates  for  domestic  reasons, 
capital  controls  can  be  used  to  restrain  capital  outflow.  But  the  evidence  from  empirical 
studies shows that the controls in Italy and France did not significantly affect the magnitude 
of capital flows.
279 Furthermore, Gros (1987) as well as Gros/Thygesen (1998, p. 132-135) 
show that despite capital controls, the domestic interest rates in Italy and France were tightly 
linked to the international rates, which also suggests the long-run ineffectiveness of capital 
controls  to  isolate  the  domestic  financial  markets.  The  main  reason  for  this  long-run 
ineffectiveness can be seen in the fact that both Italy and France are open economies with 
many financial and commercial links to international markets that allow for a variety of ways 
in which capital movements can be disguised to circumvent controls.
280 
However, despite this apparent long-run ineffectiveness, there is another reason for capital 
controls in fixed rate system like the EMS that might be more important and is of a very 
short-term nature. When large adjustments of the central rates (that exceed the width of the 
fluctuation band) of the fixed rate system become necessary, they imply a discrete jump of the 
exchange rate following the realignment.
281 If this jump could be anticipated by speculators it 
would lead to massive capital flows in order to profit from one-way bets (see section 3.3.1.3) 
Thus, if it is assumed that market agents can usually to some extent anticipate the timing and 
size of realignments, then without the protection of capital controls the anticipation of a large 
central rate adjustment would lead to massive and potentially disruptive capital flows.
282 But, 
as  is  described  in  detail  in  section  3.3.1.3,  the  disruptive  effect  of  one-way  bets  can  be 
avoided by preventing adjustments of the central parities that exceed the total width of the 
band (assuming that before the realignment the currency in question is at the band margin) 
                                                 
277 Ireland and Spain also had capital controls until 1992, but since the developments in these two countries were 
less relevant for the overall EMS experience, this analysis of the effects of capital controls will concentrate on 
France and Italy.  
278 See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 128-129. 
279 See for instance Gros/Thygesen, 1992.  
280 See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 135. 
281 See Giavazzi/Giovannini, 1989, p. 162. 
282 See Loureiro, 1996, p. 74. 77 
 
through establishing a band wide enough to accommodate large adjustments and to allow for 
overlapping  bands  in  the  case  of  realignment.  Therefore  it  has  to  be  analysed  if  capital 
controls in the EMS were important to protect the realignment procedures against disruptive 
short-term capital flows resulting from a bandwidth unable to accommodate the necessary and 
anticipated realignment. In the case of Italy it can be said that capital controls were essentially 
unnecessary to avert disruptive speculation, because no realignment led to a change of the 
lira/DM central rate larger than the total bandwidth for Italy, which was twelve percent (± six 
percent  around  the  central  parity)  until  early  1990.
283  Figure  8  shows  that  the  lira/DM 
fluctuation bands overlapped before and after realignments, since the lira/DM central rates 
always remained within the ± six percent region established by the margins of the old and 
new band. In France on the other hand, circumstances were different, since on four occasions 
the pre- and post-adjustment bands did not overlap, leading to a jump in the franc/DM market 
exchange rate (see Figure 9).
284 In the case of France it can therefore be said that capital 
controls were necessary to protect the EMS from disruptive short-term capital flows resulting 
from large realignments to the franc/DM central rates. 
In this context it should be noted that this need for protection might only arise if the necessary 
realignments are delayed (for instance due to political reasons) until their imminence becomes 
obvious to the market. Since this seems to have been the case in France, a policy of earlier 
non-predictable realignments might have allowed avoiding the pressure from capital flows 
that arose due to widely anticipated adjustments and could have made it possible for France to 
have  realignments  exceeding  their  4.5  percent  bandwidth  even  without  the  protection  of 
capital controls.
285 
Altogether, capital controls in a fixed rate system might prove to be mostly ineffective in the 
long run in isolating the domestic financial market, but helpful in the short run to stabilise 
capital flows and protect domestic interest during realignment procedures. Also, the EMS 
experience shows that while capital controls may be ineffective in the long-run to protect the 
system, they might at least be able to give the authorities additional time necessary for them 
to take the appropriate decisions in the face of crisis.
286 
                                                 
283 The maximum realignments were 6 percent in March 1981 and 8 percent in July 1985, see Table 5. After the 
adoption of the narrow margins of ± 2.25 percent there were no realignments until the lira left the system in 
September 1992 due to the EMS crisis.  
284 Note that the margins for France were ± 2.25 throughout.  
285 See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 129-132. 
286 In retrospect it seems clear that in the 1992/1993 crises (that built up more quickly in the absence of capital 
controls) the official bodies were too slow in taking the necessary decisions. See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 132.  78 
 
4.5.2.3  The Strong Currency Country’s Dominance in the EMS 
As described in section 4.4.6, the overall design of the intervention mechanism of the EMS 
asymmetrically favored the strong currency countries in the system and burdened the weak 
currency countries. The role of the strong currency country in the EMS was primarily played 
by Germany, since the DM was never subject to downwards realignment (see Table5) and 
was  generally  considered  to  be  the  anchor  currency  of  the  system.
287  As  a  result  of  the 
asymmetric distribution of adjustment constraints in the ERM, if a central bank wanted to 
target a constant nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the DM, it was unilaterally subjected to 
adjustment whenever its currency came under devaluation pressure. This asymmetry caused 
major problems within the EMS when the Bundesbank started pursuing a very restrictive 
monetary policy as a response to the inflationary pressure resulting from German unification, 
as noted in section 4.5.1.4. The general perception during the entire EMS experience that the 
DM would never be devaluated vis-à-vis another EMS currency, which was justified by the 
fact that the German inflation rates were (together with the Dutch) always the lowest in the 
EMS prior to 1991 (see Figure 4), lead to a transmission of the German monetary restriction 
to the other EMS countries.
288 The German interest rate “set a floor for the nominal interest 
rates of all other countries” (Bofinger, 2000b, p.18) that committed to target a stable nominal 
exchange  rate  against  the  DM.  This  led  to  problems  in  the  EMS,  since  some  member 
countries were forced to maintain their interest rates above the DM threshold at a level which 
was much too restrictive for their own macroeconomic conditions. This can be illustrated by 
comparing  the  actual  short-term  interest  rates  of  the  EMS  countries  with  their  respective 
Taylor rates (see Table 7 that does this for 1991).
289 According to the Taylor rate, several 
EMS  countries  could  have  pursued  interest  rates  much  lower  than  their  actual  short-term 
interest rates, which were forced to remain above the DM “floor” (9.2 percent). Thus, several 
EMS countries (for example France) had to import the German monetary restriction, even 
though there might not have been any reason for such a restrictive monetary policy stance in 
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those  countries,  which  led  to  large  macroeconomic  costs.
290  In  sum,  one  of  the  main 
deficiencies of the EMS was a common monetary policy for the entire EMS-area that was 
determined mainly according to the macroeconomic conditions of the asymmetrically favored 
dominant country (i.e. Germany) that transmitted it.
291 
When analyzing the factors that could lead to the dominance of a single currency in an EMS-
type fixed rate system, the EMS experience shows that given the institutional rules of the 
ERM, the reasons for the DM dominance where a combination of the size of the German 
economy with the very low inflation rate of Germany that led to stable expectations regarding 
exchange rate changes.
292 The hegemony of the DM could not have been explained solely by 
the size factor, since at the time of the EMS’s inception both  France  and  Italy  were not 
significantly smaller in terms of population and GDP than Germany. However, a low inflation 
rate alone would also not have sufficed for dominance in the EMS because a small country 
(e.g. the Netherlands) might have struggled to sterilize the expansionary liquidity effects of 
upper margin exchange rate interventions. 
4.5.2.4  Crises and Contagion Effects 
The first waves of speculative attacks in 1992 can essentially be attributed to the systematic 
overvaluation of certain EMS currencies that warranted a nominal depreciation to counter the 
strong real appreciation (e.g. Italy and Ireland, see Figure 6) as described in section 4.5.1.4. 
But even after the 1992 crisis had forcefully “corrected” the overvaluation of the “peripheral” 
currencies (the lira and the pound sterling left the system, while the peseta and the Irish pound 
were strongly devaluated), the speculative attacks continued on currencies where the reasons 
were not as clear-cut, for example the French franc.
293 Even though the real exchange rate of 
the franc vis-à-vis the DM showed an appreciation close to 15 percent in 1992 (see Figure 6), 
France had been able to manage such a level since 1985 and with the exception of a higher 
unemployment rate all other macroeconomic fundamentals in France were at least as good as 
in Germany (see Table 8). Thus, the initial 1992 crisis (product of the strong real appreciation 
of  certain  currencies),  and  the  resulting  overall  loss  of  credibility  of  the  ERM,  had  an 
immediate  “unwarranted”  effect  on  the  French  franc,  as  it  also  came  under  speculative 
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pressure.
294  Since  the  French  authorities  were  unwilling  to  devalue  the  franc  through 
realignment, the BdF had no alternative other than to tighten its monetary policy in order to 
avoid reaching its lower intervention point and being subjected to the asymmetrical settlement 
obligations of the VSTF. The resulting increase in interest rates severely burdened economic 
growth in France, which began to decelerate, combined with growing unemployment and a 
strong  increase  in  fiscal  deficit.
295  Once  this  situation  became  unbearable,  the  BdF 
aggressively lowered its interest rates which subsequently led to massive devaluation pressure 
on the franc that could not be contained by interventions.
296 As the French franc as well as the 
Belgian and Danish currencies fell below their lower margins, the EMS countries decided to 
effectively suspend the narrow margins of the EMS in August 1993. 
The  described  contagion  effects  of  currency  crises  on  countries  with  sound  fundamentals 
establish a basic dilemma for fixed rate systems like the EMS. A method to handle problems 
resulting  from  such  unjustified  speculative  attacks  would  be  to  suspend  the  settlement 
obligations of the system in order to allow the weak currency central bank (together with the 
strong currency country) to defend its currency through interventions, without being subject 
to  any  budget  constraint.
297  Such  an  intervention  mechanism  without  an  asset  settlement 
obligation  would  provide  a  strong  credibility  gain  for  the  intervention  promise,  since  all 
interventions would essentially be financed by the strong currency country, which can create 
intervention assets in an unlimited amount and is not restricted in its capacity to accumulate 
weak currency reserves.
298 The suspension of asset settlement obligations would also not have 
any negative effects on the intervening central banks as long as they are able to sterilize the 
liquidity effects of the interventions.
299 As described in section 3.4, the sterilization capacity 
of a strong  currency  country is limited by its  monetary base (i.e. credits to the domestic 
banking system), but can be made unlimited with the implementation of a deposit facility. 
Nevertheless, a complete suspension of the settlement obligations in a fixed rate system is not 
advisable,  because  it  could  excuse  the  weak  currency  countries  from  monetary  policy 
adjustments even if these proved to be necessary to maintain the monetary stability of the 
overall system. Thus, the settlement obligations play an important role in a fixed rate system 
as  a  device  that  protects  against  opportunistic  behavior  by  disciplining  central  banks  that 
                                                 
294 See Bofinger, 2000b, p.20. 
295 See de Boissieu, 1994, p.11-17. 
296 See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 99. 
297 See Bofinger, 1991, p. 251.  
298 See Vehrkamp, 1995, p. 75-78. 
299 See Bofinger, 2000b, p. 20. 81 
 
could otherwise follow destabilizing (i.e. inflationary) policies (see section 3.3.5). In the EMS 
context, a suspension of the settlement rules could have led to an infection of the whole ERM 
area by the inflationary policies of the Italian and French central banks in the early 1980s.
300 
A possible solution to this dilemma could be to establish the suspension of asset settlement 
obligations  as  only  temporary  and  contingent.
301  In  order  to  minimize  the  risks  of 
opportunistic behavior, the suspension of the asset settlement obligations could then only be 
allowed  under  explicit  conditions  (e.g.  if  the  weak  currency  country  meets  certain 
macroeconomic criteria) and if the exchange rate pressure is clearly identifiable as a transitory 
speculative attack. 
4.6  Overall Assessment of the EMS as an Effective Regional Exchange 
Rate Arrangement 
The central aim of this chapter of the paper was to provide a detailed analysis of the historic, 
political and economic rationale as well as the overall institutional design and functioning of a 
specific fixed rate system that was created as a step towards further monetary integration in 
the region. The European experience with the EMS shows, that while the implementation of 
such a regional exchange rate arrangement might require a long period of political consensus-
finding, once set up, it can effectively provide external stability for the region by reducing 
both nominal and real exchange rate variability for the countries participating in the system. 
Furthermore, it can possibly also contribute to the internal stabilization (i.e. reducing inflation 
and promoting inflation convergence) of the region by operating as a disciplinary device, 
although evidence proving this ability of the EMS is still rather inconclusive. Although the 
institutional design of the EMS as a parity grid standard system, instead of a currency basket 
system, was mainly the result of political negotiations rather than economic reason (section 
4.4.2), such an institutional framework can still be effectively adopted if it can avoid the main 
mistakes that led to the EMS’s 1992/1993 crisis. For instance, in case of major inflation 
differentials between participating countries, timely realignments of nominal rates could be 
necessary in order to avoid problems stemming from real appreciation and speculative capital 
flows (section 4.5.1.4). Also, if despite of the formally symmetric institutional design, the 
system is de facto asymmetrically dominated by the policy of a major participating economy 
(as was the case with Germany in the EMS), it might be required to put additional emphasis 
on  a  coordination  of  national  monetary  policies  that  takes  into  account  the  overall 
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macroeconomic  conditions  of  the  whole  currency  area  and  not  just  those  of  a  single 
participating country (section 4.5.2.3).  
Finally,  in  a  situation  with  speculative  attacks  on  a  participating  currency  that  have  no 
fundamental macroeconomic justification, it may be useful to loosen the budget constraint on 
the  weak  currency  country’s  intervention  capability  by  suspending  the  asset  settlement 
obligations  (section  4.5.2.4).  This  would  avoid  the  negative  macroeconomic  effects  of 
otherwise necessary increases in short-term interest rates in the weak currency country and 
allow for a credible defence of the overall exchange rate promise of the system. It has to be 
noted that both a suspension of the asset settlement obligations as well as a coordination of 
monetary policies that is geared to the overall economic situation of the region might be 
problematic because they weaken the disciplining effects of the fixed rate system and should 
therefore  be  coupled  to  strict  conditions  (i.e.  the  meeting  of  certain  economic  criteria). 
Stipulating these contingencies in the institutional framework of the system may prove easier 
if the participating countries share a strong preference for low inflation.
302 
In retrospect, the European integration history shows that “without the EMS the introduction 
of the euro would not have been possible” (Bofinger, 2000b, p. 1) and that the system can be 
regarded as a very efficient monetary arrangement for most of the participating European 
countries.  Thus,  a  regional  exchange  rate  system  like  the  EMS  constitutes  an  effective 
intermediate step towards monetary union.
303 Such a system is capable of stabilizing intra-
regional  exchange  rates,  therefore  pave  the  way  for  an  eventual  irrevocable  fixing  of 
exchange rates through monetary unification, as well as possibly also produce endogenous 
effects  that  further  integration  in  the  region.
304  Even  after  the  1992/1993  crisis  the  EMS 
continued to provide a steady framework and forum for monetary policy coordination and 
discussion between the European partners.
305 The experience gained from the almost 20 years 
of cooperation within the system certainly contributed to European integration in general and 
specifically to the development towards monetary unification.  
 
As Jacques Delors (1996), one of the most prominent figures in European integration history, 
notes: 
“the EMS was the indispensable trial run which, in addition to its intrinsic benefits, 
provided invaluable experience for those who would go on to lay the foundations for 
                                                 
302 See Bofinger, 2000b, p. 26. 
303 See Sosvill-Rivero/Perez-Bermejo, 2006, p. 257. 
304 See sections 2.2 and 4.5.2.1.  
305 See Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 101-102 83 
 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  It  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized  that  we  make 
progress towards European integration by increments - sometimes, admittedly, one step 
forward and two steps back - but all these concrete measures, succeed or fail, prepare 
the ground for more ambitious initiatives and serve as a learning experience.” 
 
 
5  Brief Overview of Implications for Latin America 
It is not the aim of this paper to propose how an EMS-type regional exchange rate system for 
Latin America (or a particular Latin American integration process) would specifically have to 
be designed, but rather to present the available institutional design options and to analyse how 
these interacted in a specific scenario (i.e. the historical experience of the EMS) in order to 
generally  asses  the  efficiency  of  regional  fixed  rate  systems.  Nevertheless,  after  having 
provided  an  in-depth  look  at  the  European  experience  with  such  regional  exchange  rate 
mechanism, a few basic implications for the Latin American prospects to implement such a 
scheme can be stated. 
First of all, the history of European monetary integration leading up to the creation of the 
EMS shows that setting up such an intermediate step on the way to monetary union can be a 
medium- rather than a short-term project (see section 4.2.). Before the creation of a regional 
fixed rate system for Latin America is viable, a higher degree of monetary cooperation might 
be necessary. One of the most interesting initiatives in this regard might be the “Ecuadorian 
Proposal for a New Regional Financial Architecture”, which presents three steps for setting 
up a “Regional Exchange Rate Mechanism” in Latin America.
306 The first step would be to 
establish a “Regional Monetary Agreement” through a formal cooperative commitment to 
permanently monitor exchange-rate policies and regularly share ex-ante information on the 
respective national policy mixes and macroeconomic developments. The second stage would 
then involve setting up a type of "soft" (i.e. non-binding) regional exchange rate fluctuation 
band within which the optimal exchange rates for all the participating currencies would be 
determined via regional consensus. Finally, in step three, formally binding bands would be set 
up,  establishing  an  almost-fixed,  but  adjustable,  exchange  rate  regime  and  effectively 
transforming the previous “Regional Monetary Agreement” into a real “Regional Exchange 
Rate Mechanism”. 
                                                 
306 See Páez, 2008, for further detail on the three steps. The “Regional Exchange Rate Mechanism” is put in 
quotations in order to single out the specific political proposals of this initiative. 84 
 
The European experience with the “snake”-system and later with the EMS crisis in 1992/1993 
also  showed,  that  even  a  significant  progress  in  regional  integration  can  be  followed  by 
momentary  setbacks.  The  political  will  to  pursuit  integration  is  therefore  essential,  as 
displayed  by  the  European  governments’  (especially  the  German  and  French)  tenacious 
attitude  which  paved  the  way  for  the  introduction  of  the  EMS  and  ultimately  the  EMU. 
Regarding political will in Latin America, it seems that especially the “newer” integration 
schemes UNASUR and ALBA-TCP have been pushing for further integration. Initiatives like 
the SUCRE and the Bank of the South might prove important in order to eventually set up a 
fixed rate system in Latin America. The vocal support of several Latin American presidents 
for monetary integration is also welcome, since progress in integration involves permanent 
political debate in order to ensure the acceptance of the general public. It is difficult to asses 
which  Latin  American  countries  could  assume  roles  of  political  leadership  similar  to  the 
French-German  initiative  crucial  for  the  adoption  of  the  EMS,  or  which  countries  would 
actually participate in the system. Due to their close trade relations and economic sizes it is 
often proposed that exchange rate cooperation in Latin America should start with Brazil and 
Argentina
307, and move on from there; initiatives like the Local Currency Payment System 
(see section 2.1.) might be a step in that direction. Venezuela has also played a major political 
role  in  recent  years  promoting  regional  integration  and  the  Venezuelan  led  ALBA-TCP 
agreement is possibly the most politically united integration scheme. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that Venezuela has by far the biggest inflation rates in the region and could therefore 
hardly assume a stabilizing role similar to the one played by Germany in the EMS.
308 
Assuming sufficient political will and leadership, there are still general economic factors that 
might be of relevance. A regional exchange rate arrangement might only be worthwhile given 
a certain degree of trade linkages between participating countries and, as the Italian problems 
in the EMS showed, might be more successful if inflation rates are low or at least similar. 
While  there  are  certainly  studies  that  deem  intra-regional  trade  in  Latin  America 
insufficient
309, it has nevertheless steadily grown (see Table 10) and again the endogeneity 
argument (i.e. the stabilization of intra-regional exchange rates could ex post encourage trade) 
for a regional exchange rate arrangement can be brought forward. Regarding inflation rates, 
Table 9 shows that with the exception of Venezuela these have steadily been reduced by Latin 
                                                 
307 See for instance Medina, 2004; Moccero/Winograd, 2005; Campos, 2009; Bresser-Pereira/Holland, 2009. 
308 See Table 9.  
309 See for instance Cardim, 2004; Espinosa, 2008; Peña/Flores, 2006; Foresti, 2007; Arestis et al., 2002. 85 
 
American countries.
310 In this context it has to be noted that, as described in section 4.2 and 
shown in Table 3, at the start of the EMS the participating countries were also relatively 
heterogeneous. 
The actual design of a possible regional fixed rate system in Latin America is difficult to asses 
without a clear assumption about participating countries and a required comparative analysis, 
which would exceed the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, some general aspects can be noted. 
The lack of a major credible currency in the region as well as the related political implications 
allow to practically rule out a key currency standard system for Latin America, while a parity 
grid or a currency basket could still be viable options. Due to the less asymmetrical nature of 
a currency basket standard and its ability to also relevantly encompass the currencies of major 
inter-regional trading partners (i.e. the USD and the euro), this standard is overwhelmingly 
proposed.
311 But as described in section 4.5.2.3, the asymmetrical nature of the EMS’s parity 
grid was mainly a result of the special characteristics of the German economy, which might 
not  be  replicated  by  any  Latin  American  country.  In  order  to  accommodate  for  the  still 
undeniably  large  differences  in  macroeconomic  conditions  between  Latin  American 
economies as well as the propensity for asymmetrical shocks in the region, the fluctuation 
bands  might  have  to  be  relatively  wide  and  central  rate  adjustments  steady  (possibly 
following  an  agreed  upon  path  that  could  for  instance  be  determined  by  interest  rate 
differentials
312). Again, a more specific proposal for the institutional design of the system 
requires an in-depth analysis of the particular group of countries or integration scheme (e.g. 
UNASUR, Mercosur or ALBA-TCP) adopting it. Regarding the institutionally established 
intervention promise of a possible regional fixed rate system, an important difference to the 
EMS experience might be the lack of convertible currencies in Latin America, which hinders 
foreign exchange market intervention of Latin American countries in their own currencies. As 
a result, the intervention credit facilities of the system might have to be managed through a 
common fund that pools the intervention reserves of the participating countries. Institutions 
like the Bank of the South or the ALBA-Caribbean Fund might serve in this regard. 
Other basic aspects worth consideration for future research on a specific fixed rate system 
proposal  for  Latin  America  are,  for  instance,  the  nature  of  the  individual  exchange-rate 
regimes of the countries participating in the system, dollarization in the region and the role of 
                                                 
310 The overall reduction and convergence of inflation rates in Latin America is even greater when statistics from 
the 1980s are considered. See Gruben/Mcleod, 2004.  
311  See  for  instance  Ugarteche,  2008.  Note  that  such  a  currency  basket  is  also  proposed  in  the  East  Asian 
monetary integration projects; see Williamson, 2005; Murase, 2007; Chey, 2008; Chai, 2010. 
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capital controls, to name only  a  few. The  choice of a  country’s individual regime  would 
obviously influence bilateral exchange rates in the system and determine differences between 
countries regarding the adjustments to common external shocks.
313 In this context, the role of 
the USD might also be of significance, not only as a reserve currency in the region, but also 
due  to  the  de  jure  and  de  facto  dollarization  of  several  Latin  American  economies.
314  In 
addition,  the  role  of  capital  controls  would  have  to  be  considered,  since  these  might  be 
necessary  in  order  to  defend  the  regional  exchange  rate  arrangement  against  speculative 
attacks until sufficient credibility is gained (see section 4.5.2.2).
315 
All in all, there is a myriad of institutional choices and elements worthy of in-depth analysis 
for a coherent proposal of a regional fixed rate system for Latin America. Thus, an ample 
scope for further research is provided. 
6  Summary and Final Remarks 
For  more  than  half  a  century  Latin  American  countries  have  been  pursuing  economic 
integration, and in light of new political impulses in the region like UNASUR and ALBA-
TCP the idea of forming a monetary union in Latin America has gained popularity. Since 
economic  literature  widely  dismisses  the  possibility  of  Latin  America  adopting  a  single 
currency in the short-term due to an insufficient degree of integration, a variety of authors 
have proposed establishing a regional exchange rate system as an intermediate step towards 
monetary union. 
In line with these proposals, the central aim of this paper was to provide a detailed look at 
regional fixed rate systems as an intermediate step. Following this premise, first a general 
analysis of fixed rate systems from an institutional perspective was given in order to describe 
the basic design choices available to policymakers when creating such a regional exchange 
rate arrangement. This analysis showed how the decided upon rules, which together constitute 
the institutional framework of the fixed exchange rate system, determine the overall monetary 
adjustment constraints for the participating countries in the system. 
Then, the experience of the European countries with such a fixed rate system, the European 
Monetary System was described. It was shown that the EMS did not only effectively reduce 
both nominal and real exchange rate variability for the countries participating in the system, 
                                                 
313 See Machinea/Rozenwurcel, 2005, p. 45-46. 
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Central American countries. For an analysis on de facto dollarization in Latin America see Feige et al., 2002. 
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but also constituted a successful intermediate step towards monetary unification in Europe. 
Furthermore, an EMS-type system can be considered an efficient monetary arrangement in its 
own right, even if sufficient integration for the full monetary union is not reached or if this 
goal becomes undesirable for political reasons, which could for instance emerge in light of the 
recent developments in Europe. The general lessons drawn from the EMS analysis provide 
important implications for the Latin American prospects of establishing a regional exchange 
rate mechanism. These implications were broadly described and will have to be considered in 
further research that might be aimed at proposing how a fixed rate system for Latin America 

























I.  Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1 Openness – Imports as share of GDP 
   (1960)  (1987) 
Belgium  39.3  75.6 
Ireland  37.2  60.0 
Netherlands  45.9  59.3 
Denmark  33.4  36.7 
Germany  16.2  28.5 
United Kingdom   22.4  28.2 
France  12.9  25.0 
Italy  12.5  23.4 
EC12  10.4  12.3 
United States   4.4  10.1 
Japan  11.0  11.4 
 
Source: European Economy, No. 34, November 1987; in: Giavazzi/Giovannini, 1989, p. 3 
 
Table 2 Trade within the 12 EC countries as share of total trade 
   Exports           Imports       
  1958  1970  1986    1958  1970  1986 
Denmark  59.4  44.2  46.8     60.0  48.7  47.2 
Be - Lux  55.4  75.2  72.9    55.5  66.3  69.9 
Netherlands  58.3  72.6  75.7    50.7  63.4  61.0 
France  30.9  58.1  57.8    28.3  56.0  64.4 
Germany  37.9  49.8  50.9    36.3  51.7  54.2 
Italy  34.5  51.7  53.5    30.2  47.5  55.4 
UK  21.8  32.7  47.9    21.8  29.4  50.4 
EC12  37.2  53.4  57.2     35.2  50.3  57.8 
 
Source: European Economy, No. 34, November 1987; in: Giavazzi/Giovannini, 1989, p. 4 89 
 
Table 3  ERM founding countries in 1979 
Source: OECD,  Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtug der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 





Table 4 The ecu currency basket 
  Since 13. March 
1979 
Since 17. September 
1984 
Since 21. September 
1989 
D-Mark  0.8280  0.7190  0.6242 
Pound Sterling  0.08850  0.08780  0.08784 
French Franc  1.150  1.310  1.332 
Italian Lira  109.00  140.00  151.80 
Dutch Guilder  0.2860  0.2560  0.2198 
Bel. Franc  3.660  3.710  3.301 
Lux. Franc  0.14  0.14  0.13 
Danish Krone  0.2170  0.2190  0.1976 
Irish Punt  0.007590  0.008710  0.008552 
Greek Drachma  -  1.15  1.44 
Spanish Peseta  -  -  6.885 
Port. Escudo  -  -  1.393 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank October 1999; Devisenkursstatistik; in: Bofinger, 2000b. 
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Table 5 Realignments in the ERM 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 1997; purely technical adjustments are not reported. NM: country 
did not participate in the exchange rate mechanism; in: Bofinger, 2000b. 92 
 
Table 6 Nominal exchange rate variability* against ERM8 currencies 
  1960-68  1969-78  1979-83  1984-87  1988-91  1992-95  1996 
Average 
ERM8 





0.62  2.09  2.73  1.89  1.43  2.14  1.55 
USA  0.21  2.18  2.81  3.32  3.27  2.94  2.01 
Source: Gros and Thygesen (1998). 
*Variability is defined as the weighted sum of the standart deviation of changes in the 
monthly logarithm of monthly bilateral ecchange rates (times 100). The weights are the 




Table 7 Taylor interest rates and actual short-term interest rates in 1991 
Country  Taylor interest rate*  Actual interest rate 
Belgium  6.5  9.3 
Denmark  3.0  9.7 
France  5.8  9.6 
Germany  8.9  9.2 
Ireland  5.7  10.4 
Italy  11.0  12.2 
Netherlands  6.5  9.3 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook; in Bofinger, 2000b. 
*Taylor interest rate calculated with the original Taylor formula: i=2+inflation 
rate+0.5(inflation rate-2)+0.5(output-gap).  
 
 
Table 8 Macroeconomic fundamentals in France and Germany (1992)  
  Germany  France 
Inflation rate  5.1  2.4 
General government structural 
balance 
-3.8  -3.6 
General government gross 
financial liabilities 
44.4  45.5 
Current account balance  -1.0  0.4 
Unemployment rate  7.7  10.4 
































Table 9 Annual Inflation Latin America 1999-2009 
SOURCE: ECLAC, 2008-2009 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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South America             
Intra-regional trade  -5.6  7.8  20.7  5.7  8.9  23.6 
Extra-regional trade  -4.0  4.5  11.2  5.4  10.1  23.3 
Total trade  -3.7  4.1  9.2  5.3  10.5  23.3 
Central America             
Intra-regional trade  -8.5  -0.3  15.5  11.8  8.4  13.9 
Extra-regional trade  -0.8  3.2  10.2  18.5  4.7  17.0 
Total trade  -2.4  2.5  11.0  17.3  5.1  16.5 
Mexico             
Intra-regional trade  -0.8  15.5  10.8  10.5  1.6  6.4 
Extra-regional trade  2.4  9.6  9.1  8.6  9.7  17.6 
Total trade  0.4  13.4  10.4  10.1  3.5  9.4 
 














Source: OANDA, in: Ugarteche 2008. 












Figure 2 Determinants of Monetary Adjustment Constraints in 
Institutionalized Fixed Rate Systems 
Source: Author’s own illustration, adopted from Vehrkamp, 1995. 97 
 












1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
F I NL B DK IRL D
 












1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
F I NL B DK IRL D
%
 













1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
FRF ITL NLG BEF DKR IRP
 












1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
FRF ITL NLG BEF DEK IRP
 





















































Figure 7 EMS and Non-EMS Inflation Rates 

















































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, line ae; European Economy, statistical 
appendix; in: Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 130. 
















Figure 9 FRF/DM rate within the bands 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, line ae; European Economy, statistical 
appendix; in: Gros/Thygesen, 1998, p. 131. 102 
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